



Gazette

OCTOBER, 1947

30c

in this issue:

WE MUST LEARN TO STOP TANKS

also

The North China Operation

and

Staffing the New Marine Division

HS

This Month's Cover

THE SCENE ON THE COVER WILL NOT BE familiar to marines, since the Jap tanks we met were mostly rather flimsy affairs. Moreover, the Japanese were fortunately somewhat less than clever in their employment of tanks, which was probably very lucky for us. But will it be the same in future wars? LtCol Arthur J. Stuart thinks not, and he's frankly a little worried. His article begins on page 18.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Professional Magazine for the United States Marines

JOURNAL OF THE MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION

Offices: Marine Corps Schools, P. O. 106, Quantico, Va.

Telephone: Extension 4780



BrigGen O. P. Smith Editor-in-Chief
Maj Houston Stiff Editor and Publisher
Capt Edwin Simmons Managing Editor
Lt Ray W. Arnold Business Manager


EDITORIAL BOARD

Col Carson A. Roberts
LtCol Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
LtCol Frederick P. Henderson
LtCol Clair W. Shisler

EDITORIAL STAFF: PFC William A. McCluskey, Mrs. Marion Gibson.

BUSINESS STAFF: MSgt Horace L. Hinderliter, Sgt J. J. Fantaski, PFC Thurman Albertson, PFC William E. Larkin, Mrs Nell Baxter.

VOLUME 31, NUMBER 10. Published monthly by the Marine Corps Association, Marine Corps Schools, P. O. 106, Quantico, Va. Copyright, 1947. Entered as second-class matter at the post office at Quantico, Va., under the act of March 3, 1879. Additional second class entry at Baltimore, Md. Single copy, 30 cents; subscription rate, \$3.00 a year. Subscriptions of all armed forces personnel include membership in the Marine Corps Association. Articles, monographs, studies, and letters of professional interest are invited. Opinions expressed in the GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Marine Corps Headquarters. GAZETTE material may not be reproduced without written permission.



PROVIDED BY NEW SPERRY ENGINE ANALYZER

■ The new Sperry Engine Analyzer will enable your flight engineer to keep his *eye on the pulse* of his engines—promptly visualize the slightest irregularity in engine function. In the analyzer indicator the flight engineer can examine at any time during flight, patterns that show the characteristics of engine vibration, ignition system performance, and synchronization between magnetos and between engines. These characteristic patterns *detect, locate and identify* the malfunctions and impending failures that may occur during flight operation.

■ When the airplane comes into an airport, specific engine maintenance needs are already known. Small mechanical corrections can then be made in minutes instead of the hours formerly required to locate the cause of malfunction. This results in an increased number of possible flying hours per day and greater reliability in meeting schedules.
■ Our Aeronautical Department will be glad to supply complete details.



Sperry Gyroscope Company, Inc.

EXECUTIVE OFFICES: GREAT NECK, NEW YORK
NEW YORK • LOS ANGELES • SAN FRANCISCO

• DIVISION OF THE SPERRY CORPORATION
NEW ORLEANS • CLEVELAND • SEATTLE



The RCA Metal Detector "blows the whistle" on any particle of metal that may have crept into the package.


RCA Electronic Metal Detector— ***arrests "stowaways" in packaged products!***

It stands guard over everything from breakfast cereals to candy, from cigarettes to cough drops... eliminating the chance that a bit of foreign metal might slip by. It helps American industry—that employs every precaution to assure product purity—to protect automatically the foods you buy.

High-frequency radio waves form an invisible wall—sound the alarm, if any metal is accidentally present. Even tiny metallic flakes with a diameter of 70-thousandths

of an inch instantly cause rejection by this amazing RCA achievement.

The RCA Metal Detector was developed by RCA engineers in co-operation with RCA Laboratories—a world center of radio and electronic research. The same pioneering, research and accumulative experience that produced this Metal Detector keep all RCA products at the top in their fields—back up the performance of RCA communication and electronic navigation equipment afloat and ashore.



The RCA Metal Detector operates automatically (with a rejection device or by stopping the conveyor belt) or manually (by giving an alarm or signal). For further information, write to RCA, Victor Division, Engineering Products Department, Camden, New Jersey.

RCA—For 27 Years the Fountainhead of Electronic Research and Engineering



RADIO CORPORATION of AMERICA
ENGINEERING PRODUCTS DEPARTMENT, CAMDEN, N.J.

In Canada: **RCA VICTOR Company Limited, Montreal**



A Pioneer in Pensions

Bell System Plan for Employee Pensions and Benefits has been in effect for thirty-four years.

Long before there was any thought of Social Security or of pensions by most companies, the Bell System instituted a Pension Plan for its employees. The plan went into effect in 1913.

The Bell System Pension Plan was not only one of the first pension plans but it has

continued to be one of the best for employees. The full cost is paid by the Company. The employee is not called upon to contribute anything.

16,967 Bell System employees (10,769 men and 6,198 women) were receiving pensions at the end of 1946.

The Pension Plan is part of a comprehensive Benefit Plan that also covers sickness, accident, disability and death payments. These were paid to more than 110,000 employees and their dependents in 1946.

During that year, one Bell System employee in every seven benefited directly from the sickness provisions alone.

All of this is in the interest of the public as well as telephone employees. Because for you to have good service we must have good people to give it to you.

These Pension and Benefit Plans are part of the Bell Telephone Company's responsibility as a good employer and a good citizen in every community in which it operates.

BELL TELEPHONE SYSTEM



New Safety from the Ground Up!...



**IT&T serves
the world in these eight
additional ways:**

TELEPHONE OPERATIONS

IT&T has modernized and expanded national telephone networks in many countries, owns and operates 7 systems in Latin America and Shanghai, China.

MANUFACTURE OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT

IT&T factories in 26 countries, sales offices in many more, make it the largest international communications and radio supplier.

CABLE AND RADIOTELEGRAPH COMMUNICATIONS

IT&T associates have 47,000 miles of submarine cable, 6600 miles of landline connections, over 60 international radiotelegraph circuits.

RADIOTELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS

IT&T has installed and operates the radio stations connecting most of the countries of South America by radiotelephone with 95% of the telephones of the world.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

IT&T research and development activities have been responsible for an outstanding record of contributions in the field of communications as well as electronics.

MARINE COMMUNICATIONS SALES AND SERVICE



IT&T associates operate 7 U.S. marine communications shore stations and have 152 sales-service agencies at principal world ports.

TECHNICAL AND ADVISORY SERVICES

IT&T technical and advisory services are supplied to certain government telephone systems as well as to privately owned telephone operating enterprises.

EXPORT

IT&T maintains an export department which supplies its customers their complete requirements of electrical equipment, including products of other manufacturers.



AIR transportation's world-wide growth is being accompanied by amazing advances in radio aerial navigation aids. In the forefront of this development are IT&T and its manufacturing associate, Federal Telephone and Radio Corporation, Clifton, New Jersey. Backed by IT&T research, Federal is one of the foremost manufacturers of aviation communications...ground-to-plane and point-to-point radio equipment, Instrument Landing Systems, GCA (Ground Control Approach), Direction Finders and Radio Ranges. Federal equipment contributes vitally to dependable aircraft operations...and to the public's increasing reliance on air transport. Navar, Navaglobe and other IT&T-Federal developments coming from the laboratories promise a new era in aviation...with all-weather flight traffic control and global navigation providing certainty and safety surpassing even the present high standards.

INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH CORPORATION
67 Broad Street, New York 4, N. Y.

America's World-Wide Leader in Communications, Electronic Research and Precision Manufacture

PASSING IN REVIEW

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO MARINE READERS

Armorer's Catalog . . .

WEAPONS OF WORLD WAR II—MajGen G. M. Barnes, USA, (Ret), 317 pages, illustrated. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. \$7.50.

This work is a description of the mission of the Ordnance Department, U. S. Army, its organization, and the manner in which it performed in conjunction with American industry during the period of World War II. It includes a brief description of each major item of small arms and aircraft armament, ammunition of all types, field and anti-aircraft artillery, mortars, rockets and their launchers, tanks, gun motor carriages, and motor transport (the last is carried under ordnance in the army). It deals briefly with standardization procedures, the development of new materials, the fuel and lubricant problem, technical intelligence, ballistics, research, and development under wartime conditions.

Whereas in the Marine Corps ordnance is essentially maintenance and ammunition supply, in the army ordnance is responsible for the design, development, procurement, storage, issue, and maintenance of all ordnance equipment required by the ground forces. This book gives a good idea how the first three are done. Of particular interest is the manner in which co-operation between the science-ordnance-industry team was effected.

In spite of the fact that the book does not include The Bomb, naval weapons, aircraft, or much non-shooting ordnance, the variety and quantity of materiel furnished our troops is impressive. 49,234 medium tanks of the M4 series were produced for all purposes during the war. More than 1,000 of the 90mm, M36, gun motor carriages were used in France and Germany, not to mention other types of tank destroyers and heavy gun motor carriages. Thirteen different types of ammunition were provided for the 105mm howitzer. The author states the M6

heavy tank was developed one year ahead of the German Tiger tank, and that 40 were produced, but never used in battle because of excessive weight. "Little David," the 914mm mortar, is given appropriate treatment.

This book will be of genuine interest to any professional military man. It is easily read, well arranged, and excellently illustrated.

MajGen Barnes was Chief of the Research and Development Service, Office of the Chief of Ordnance, from 1942 to 1945. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal for his performance of duty in that responsible position.

CRB

Military Small Arms . . .

HATCHER'S NOTEBOOK—MajGen Julian S. Hatcher, USA, Ret. 482 pages, illustrated. Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co. \$5.00

Gen Hatcher's forty years of Army service were devoted almost exclusively to ordnance matters, as were his energetic non-duty activities. A specialist in small arms and machine guns, he was logically assigned to many Army experimental projects. This experience and a flair for writing have firmly established him as perhaps the foremost authority on small arms in this country. His four previous books have become standard reference works, as will this book.

Hatcher's Notebook, as the title implies, is a random collection of gun dope, some of which will interest only gunsmiths and ballisticians. Military men will be particularly interested in the chapters on the Springfield, development of the machine gun, and the military semiautomatic rifle. Much of the information contained therein has never before appeared in print. The illustrations are excellent, many of the photographs apparently being from the author's private collection.

Disrespectful persons may find a trace of humor in Gen Hatcher's account of the Army's development of the semiautomatic rifle. Seems the Ordnance Department had plugged along for

Any book reviewed may be purchased through the Gazette Bookshop

NOW YOU CAN OWN The Complete Story of Marine Aviation in Permanent Form



DEVILBIRDS

THE STORY OF
UNITED STATES MARINE AVIATION
IN WORLD WAR II

by JOHN A. DeCHANT

Foreword by GEN. A. A. VANDEGRIFT

Devilbirds is the whole stirring story of Marine Corps Aviation from its start in 1912 through World War I and the peace-time campaigns in Haiti, Nicaragua and China to the end of our war with Japan. Above all it is the story of the hundred thousand men who supported Marine infantry in 55 amphibious landings, shot down nearly 2,400 Japanese planes, sank some 900 enemy ships, smothered by-passed island garrisons, and sparked the lightning advances across the Pacific.

ALL THE ACTION—AND THE ACES. Devilbirds brings you thrilling accounts of all the air action of every campaign—Wake, Midway, Guadalcanal, the Solomons, the Philippines, Iwo, Okinawa, and the often-neglected fighting in the Central Pacific. You can thrill again to the fabulous exploits of Foss, Swett, "Pappy" Boyington and all the other aces—and the crews who made their greatness possible.

PHOTOS, INSIGNIA, etc.—IN PERMANENT FORM
If you have read the parts of this story that have run in the *Gazette*, you will want to own the complete book—with its 32 pages of magnificent photographs, its foreword by the Commandant of the Corps, its end-sheets of Marine Air Unit insignia, its list of aces, its glossary of plane names and Navy designations, etc. You can get these—and the full history—in one permanent volume only in this splendid book. Send for your copy of *Devilbirds* today.

MAIL THIS COUPON TODAY

HARPER & BROTHERS, 637 Madison Ave., N.Y. 22, N.Y.
Please send me a copy of *DEVILBIRDS*. Within 10 days I will remit \$4.00, plus postage, or return the book. Check here if you enclose purchase price, in which case publisher pays postage. Return privilege guaranteed.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ 7020A

years, working with various self-loading designs. After a time, the .276 cartridge, which had been developed in the Frankford Arsenal, was rather obscurely established as standard for semiautomatic rifles. At long length, after many, many tests, one rifle (an early model of the Garand) seemed to answer all requirements, and recommendations for the adoption of this weapon (which was, of course, caliber .276) were laid on the desk of the Army Chief of Staff—at that time, one Gen MacArthur. Gen MacArthur disapproved the recommendations, stating that they had been made under a misapprehension; there would be no change in the caliber of the service ammunition. This, Gen Hatcher says, had the effect of "a sort of figurative atomic bomb (bursting) in the semiautomatic rifle business."

This is an NRA Library Book, which indicates that it has been recommended as standard on the subject by the National Rifle Association.

HS

Paratroopers . . .

FOUR STARS OF HELL—Capt Laurence Critchell. 354 pages. New York: Declan X. McMullen Company. \$3.75

"There is really only one way to look at war, and that is through the eyes of the men who fought it. You gain little by going to the high peaks where the plans are made, where regiments of men are only blocks of fire power; you gain little except that sense of absolute power which, as Lord Acton said, absolutely corrupts. It is better to stay down where your fellow men stayed, close to the earth and the terror. For the truth of war is there, among solitary human beings who have no possessions except their lives."

Thus in his author's note Capt Laurence Critchell, recently of the 101st Airborne Division, states how he will relate the story of the 501st Parachute Regiment and its four major operations in the European theater.

Critchell, who apparently served as a junior officer in this regiment during its activation, training, and combat operations, describes with a keen eye for details and a feeling for the emotions of fighting men, how this unit lived and fought.

Marines will find the growing pains of the 101st Airborne Division and its 501st Parachute Regiment quite similar to those that accompanied the youth of the Marine divisions. But in the

special training of the paratroopers, their stay in England, and their subsequent airborne operations in Europe much that is new and interesting will be noted.

Critchell tells how the 501st jumped into Normandy on D-Day. He describes the confusion and the mistakes. In a series of small action reports he depicts the character of this initial operation; the fighting among the farms and hedgerows and how in spite of inexperience and errors the paratroopers' training and leadership enabled them to play a part in the invasion that contributed much to its overall success.

Returning to England, the Division rested and prepared for another operation. After several false starts, the 101st Airborne Division jumped into Holland alongside the 82d Airborne and there these two veteran outfits fought in a manner that belied the failure of the attempt at Arnhem.

In Holland the 501st spent some two months in the lines fighting typical infantry actions; patrolling, living in the muddy canal country, and always under fire. They were with the British Army there, the terrain and people were different, and the account of a particular patrol action

all make this one of the most interesting sections of the book.

Trucked back into France late in the fall of 1944, the 501st and the rest of the Division were in the process of getting back into fighting trim, re-equipping, and resting when the Germans broke through in the Ardennes. The subsequent defense by the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne has become part of our heritage and all military men should be familiar with it.

Critchell's tactical discussions, descriptions of the men, their leaders, the fighting, and the scene at Bastogne are particularly well done.

The last section of the book is rather general in its description of the crumbling German situation, spring in France, passes to Paris, "alerts" for possible operations, and finally plans to help secure and assist in the release of prisoners of war still in German hands.

The regiment eventually moved to Berchtesgaden in the shadow of the Bavarian Alps. This all represented the fourth "star of hell."

Laurence Critchell, a reserve officer still on active duty and now assistant to the Under Secretary of War, is a professional writer. His skill is quite evident in this book. The happy combina-

BG SPARK PLUGS . . . SERVING WORLD AVIATION FOR 30 YEARS



THE BG CORPORATION

136 West 52nd St., New York 19, N. Y.

MANUFACTURERS OF BOTH CERAMIC-INSULATED AND
MICA-INSULATED AVIATION SPARK PLUGS



OFFICERS!

**Choose the Best
in Life Insurance**

CHOOSE THE UNITER . . . This policy combines the best features of all known forms of permanent Life Insurance. Officers of the Uniformed Services find complete satisfaction in its provisions . . . tailored to their own requirements, designed for officers only.

FOR FACTS concerning the Uniter Life Insurance Policy, send your name, rank, organization, date of birth and address to the Home Office.

UNITED SERVICES
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
1600 20th Street, N. W., Washington 9, D. C.

tion of plenty of combat experience with an ability to write in a lucid and interesting manner results in a very worthwhile "battle experience" for the military reader.

JADJR.

Japanese Prison Camps . . .

THE HARD WAY HOME — Col W. C. Braly, USA (Ret). 263 pages. Washington: Infantry Journal Press. \$3.50

This is a book written by a repatriated prisoner of war concerning the wanderings, treatment, and daily lives of one group of prisoners of war of Japan from the time of surrender of Corregidor until the journey home. Col Braly throughout almost the entire period of his captivity served in some administrative capacity in connection with prison camp life and thus was constantly dealing with the Japanese authorities. This association afforded him an excellent opportunity to carefully study and analyze their character and reactions under varying conditions. *The Hard Way Home* is written in a pleasing, easily readable manner. It does not contain too many boring, repetitious details which a book of this type could have, yet with sufficient details to make it interesting and of some historical

value. The author has not attempted to glorify the prisoner of war. He has presented in narrative form incidents which occurred in prison camps, on marches, on board prison ships, and on trains while moving from one prison camp to another. This narration of events is valuable because it portrays the character, thoughts, and reactions of the Japanese under varying conditions; i.e., the moment of victory, the changing tide, and finally, defeat. I think on the whole he has done it very well. In a few places he could have given more details as to their cruel reactions under sudden dangerous or adverse conditions to more clearly depict their brutal character. For example, their calculated, cruel treatment while we were penned up like rats in a trap in the steerage of the *Oryoku Maru* in Keelung Harbor during the air strikes of October 12th and 13th (Friday), 1944, without boring one with too much repetitious detailed description.

I also believe a wonderful opportunity was missed to compare the inherent character of the Jap with that of the white man when, at Mukden, after the turning over of the administration of the camp to the Americans by the Russians, the occasion presented itself for us to carry out our threats and long-cherished ambitions of revenge. I know of but two incidents of this nature, and in neither case was serious injury done.

This is a particularly propitious moment for a book of this type to be offered to the public now that preparatory steps are being taken towards a peace treaty.

"The Japanese Army's complete scorn of International Law and civilized practices had made a mockery of morality and turned its soldiers into sadists. Far from any fear of being called to account, they gloried in the fanatical belief that under the Emperor they could do no wrong. They thought no more of abusing a prisoner of war than of rubbing out an ant and probably found it much more enjoyable. That is just one of the million reasons why the Japanese Army and its teachings must cease to exist.

"Thus after nearly three years of privations, untold suffering, abuse, and humiliation the lives of over three thousand Americans had been snuffed out. Three times that number had already died at O'Donnell, at Cabanatuan, and in the many vile work camps. All could be laid directly to Japanese Army negligence, inefficiency, and willful, studied criminal maltreatment. Most of our captors didn't care. *It's high time they were made to care.*"

DC

OCTOBER 1947

CONTENTS

PASSING IN REVIEW	5	STAFFING THE PEACETIME MARINE DIVISION	37
THE NORTH CHINA OPERATION, PART I <i>Maj Robert E. Churley</i>	10	DEVIL BIRDS, PART IX <i>Capt John DeChant</i>	46
IN BRIEF	17	THE MARINE CORPS AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT	57
WE MUST LEARN TO STOP TANKS <i>LtCol Arthur J. Stuart</i>	18	MESSAGE CENTER; TO THE EDITOR	60
THE MARINES IN THE PACIFIC WAR, PART XIV <i>Fletcher Pratt</i>	26	THE BLUE UNIFORM	IV COVER

Picture credits: All pictures official Army, Navy, or Marine Corps photos unless otherwise credited.

This Month and Next

• *End Run in the Solomons* by LTCOL ALPHA L. BOWSER, JR., promised for this issue, has been postponed until next month because the timeliness of *Staffing the Peacetime Marine Division* made its substitution advisable.


• What if you were a commander faced with the security of the entire Western Hemisphere? Global warfare calls for global thinking. MAJ GEN PEDRO DEL VALLE does just that in next month's *Strategical Study of the Atlantic Theater*.

• Next month's *Kamikaze Attack* is a vivid word picture by MSgt ROGER EMMONS of what happened to the Marine detachment when the

USS *Tennessee* was beset by a flight of seven Kamikazes.

• Tinian went so smoothly that it looked easy—afterwards. But there were special problems to be worked out in this "model" operation. FLETCHER PRATT presents these in detail in next month's installment of *The Marines in the Pacific War*.

• Next month CAPT JOHN DECHANT concludes the *Devil Birds* series with a brief chapter on the victory phase of the operations in the air. Also next month will conclude the two-part article on *The North China Operation* by MAJ ROBERT E. CHURLEY.



The North China Operation

THE SAILING OF THE USS *Renville* from Taku Bar on 20 June 1947, marked the completion of almost twenty months' duty by the marines of the 1st Marine Division in North China. The troops of Headquarters Battalion, 1st Engineer Battalion, and of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion were but a tiny fraction of the 50,000 marines who composed the Marine Corps force in China in January 1946. Over 100,000 Leathernecks marched the streets of Tientsin and Peiping, Tangku, Tsingtao, and Chinwangtao during the year and a half that elapsed between the arrival of the first wave at Taku Bar and the embarkation of Division Headquarters aboard the *Renville* at the same port. It was with mixed emotions that the Devil Dogs watched the flat brown land slip away; happiness at returning

By Maj Robert A. Churley

home, sadness at leaving friends made during their stay in China; their feeling of a job well done tinged by disillusionment about China's hope for a peaceful future. The sober farewells of the few people lining the docks that early morning were far different from the tumultuous welcome received by the marines as they made their triumphal entry into China to accept the

surrender of the beaten Japanese.

When the Empire of Japan sued for unconditional surrender a few days after the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki, the main forces of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, were regrouping for the first phase of the final assault on the home islands of Japan, scheduled for 7 October, 1945. But instead of storming the heavily defended island fortress of Japan,

Part I: When the first marines landed at Taku Bar in 1945 they were greeted with unusual enthusiasm by the liberated Chinese people. To the North, however, there was a caldron simmering that got hotter: the belligerent Chinese Reds

October 1945 found the United States Marine Corps embarked on one of the most curious missions of its 172 years.

The signing of the surrender agreement between the representatives of the United Nations and of the Empire of Japan aboard the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay meant the end of the war in the Pacific. It was hoped, but by no means certain, that Hirohito's acceptance of the surrender terms would mean the docile submission of the thousands upon thousands of Nipponese troops in China. The III Amphibious Corps, commanded by MajGen Keller E. Rockey and composed of the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine Air Wing, was rushed to North China, with the mission of accepting, or forcing, Japanese surrender; initiating the repatriation of Japanese military and civilian personnel, and with bringing a steady influence to bear on the volcanic situation in North China. The marines were the first United Nations troops to arrive in the area north of the Yangtze and, although plans existed for the movement of China government armies into North China, it would be some time before they could arrive in sufficient strength to cope with the surrender and the repatriation of the Japanese. It must be remembered that the marines went to China as a result of suggestions made by the Chinese government at Potsdam; we did not land as an occupation force but as representatives of the United Nations, military allies of the National Government of China.

This, then, was the situation which existed in North China when the main body of the III Amphibious Corps landed in Tangku, the port of Tientsin, on 1 October 1945. The area delimited for Marine Corps control was widely garrisoned by Nipponese forces fully intact, still armed, as ready for offensive action as they had ever been. It was considered well within the realm of possibility that the reaction of these semi-autonomous North China Area Army forces would not parallel the acquiescence with which the Japanese forces at home accepted the surrender of the head of the Nipponese government. North China had been under Japanese domination for eight years and while the majority of

Northern Chinese were then believed loyal at heart to the Nationalist government, they had lived so long under Japanese control and for so many months had heard nothing of the activities and the ideals of the United Nations except that which was told them by either the Japanese or the Communist underground, that their reaction to the coming of the Marines could not be predicted. Another factor in the situation was the Soviet army; the Russians had just overrun Manchuria, their most advanced units were inside the Great Wall at Shanhakuan and probing the North China plain from the passes to the north along the Wall. It was no particular secret that the Soviets were willing and ready to move on into Tientsin and Peiping.

AT THE END OF THE WAR, the Nationalist government held nominal control over an army of about two million conscripted troops, well-armed by Chinese standards, led by a number of American trained and equipped divisions and



MAJ ROBERT A. CHURLEY graduated from the University of California in 1938, entering the Marine Corps Reserve two years later. He was called to active duty and was later commissioned. Maj Churley was ordered to Samoa

and later New Caledonia for duties as administrative officer. In 1944 he returned to the United States for Chinese language instruction at the University of California. 1946-47 saw him in various Intelligence capacities with the III Amphibious Corps and 1st Marine Division in China. His present duty is Staff Secretary of the 1st Marine Division in Camp Pendleton.

a small air force. But more important than manpower to the Chinese government was the promise to that government by the United States that transportation would be furnished to help it in the race against the Communists for Japanese-controlled territory and arms in North China. The promise by the United States government was fulfilled and the first post war year saw 15 Nationalist armies, approximately 360,000 troops, lifted to North China and Manchuria.

Opposing the Nationalists in the North China area were but a fraction of this number of Communists. The number of regular Communists troops stationed in North China (not including Shantung nor Manchuria) at the end of the war, totalled about 200,000. Regular Communist units in the Peiping area numbered about 31,500, while Red regiments around Tientsin controlled perhaps 15,000 regulars. Along the Peiping-Chinwangtao highway, which cuts directly across the northern part of Hopei Province, forty-odd thousand Communists controlled every place but the actual line of communication. South of Tientsin, along the Tientsin-Pukow rail line to a point about one hundred miles south of Tientsin, "numbered" regiments (as differentiated from village defense forces and road-protecting units) totalled some 46,000 Communists. Shantung, long a Communist stronghold, was the lair of the New Fourth Army with its almost 200,000 Red partisans. Manchuria was still almost empty of Chinese Communists; the Chinese Communists' mass movement to Manchuria did not start until a month after the end of the war.

¶ PRESIDENT TRUMAN, in outlining the United States foreign policy towards China, stated, on 18 December 1945 that the removal of Japanese influence from Asia and the return of all China to effective Chinese governmental control was of the utmost importance to world peace. The movement of marines to North China, there to accept the surrender of the Japanese, there to participate in the removal of Japanese influence in Asia by the repatriation of Japanese civil and military personnel to the home islands, there to assist in the movement of Chinese government units, and there to seize strategic areas pending the arrival of Nationalist units, was part and parcel of our declared policy towards China.

The Japanese forces in the North China area totalled 228,246; these troops were commanded by LtGen Hiroshi Nemoto, whose headquarters were in Peiping. The Marine Corps' "first order of business" after its arrival in North China

was to insure the surrender of these troops. Nemoto apparently believed that his troops had no alternative but to surrender, and on 6 October 1945 the first of his subordinate commands capitulated to the Marines. The surrender of LtGen Ginnosuke Uchida's 118th Division to the III Amphibious Corps Commander, MajGen Keller E. Rockey, marked the first step towards returning North China to Chinese control.

Two more surrenders of major Japanese units in North China, which further illustrate the role played by the Marines in the removal of Japanese influence in China were these: the surrender of LtGen Hiroshi Nemoto and his headquarters on 10 October at Peiping when the Generalissimo, War Area Commander Sun Lien Chung, and MajGen Keller E. Rockey accepted the sword of the North China Area Commander of the Japanese Imperial Army on that eventful day; and later in the month when MajGen Lemuel E. Shepherd, commanding general of the 6th Marine Division, accepted the surrender of MajGen Eiji Nagano's 5th Independent Mixed Brigade in Tsingtao.

The effective removal of the influence of Japan was accomplished by the capitulation and repatriation of Japanese military and civilians. A total of 161,483 Japanese military personnel surrendered in the Peiping-Tientsin-Chinwangtao area and were repatriated through Tangku while 66,763 Japanese soldiers and sailors were disarmed and shipped home from Tsingtao. 237,091 Japanese civilians — mercantile, industrial, and political representatives of the Empire on the North China Plain went home via Tangku. 66,867 Nipponee civilians embarked at Tsingtao for the home islands. The North China Marines initiated the repatriation of the Japanese, and cooperated with the National government of China from January 1946, when the Chinese assumed responsibility for the repatriation until August 1946 when the repatriation of Nipponee and Koreans from North China was declared to have been officially completed. Koreans residing in North China were repatriated in accordance with the policy of returning the area to Chinese control and of eliminating a possible Japanese influence. 32,212 Koreans were returned from Tangku and Tsingtao to the Korean Peninsula.

Soon after the marines had landed and seized the most vital areas in North China, thereby filling the political and military vacuum left by the collapse of the Japanese, Nationalist units succeeded in restoring a measure of control over



When they first landed in September 1945, the Marines' first job in China was the receiving of the Japanese surrender. Shown above: Tsingtao surrender ceremonies.

the strategic line of communication in Hopei and over all the key cities on the North China Plain and in Shantung. The Nationalists met with only minor opposition to their extension of control over the strategic littoral and over the rail and highway communication lines. Communist activity in the first few weeks after the Japanese surrender was limited to procurement of food and arms by raiding and to sporadic attacks against isolated villages and garrisons under Nationalist control. The Communist threat to the extension of Nationalist control would develop later; in October 1945 for example, the railroad between Peiping and Chinwangtao, later to be subjected to almost constant harassment, was cut but a few times by the Communists.

In addition to harassment of the line of communication and attacks on outlying Nationalist garrisons, the Communists were then believed capable of aiding their cause by precipitating incidents which would involve United States personnel, thus causing U.S. public opinion to demand American withdrawal, and of emphasizing any misbehaviour on the part of American

troops, thereby exploiting the latent animosity towards foreigners so long characteristic of China. While the Reds were fully capable of attacking isolated Marine Corps garrisons, such as those along the Peiping-Mukden railroad, it was believed that this course of action, which might anger the American people, was not too likely to be undertaken by the Chinese Communist Party. This hesitancy, which resulted in almost amicable relations between U.S. and Chinese Communist forces when the marines first arrived, soon disappeared. As it became apparent that the United States policy of seizing the strategic areas and communication lines and of holding them until Nationalist forces arrived in sufficient strength to take over, was one in direct opposition to the desires of the Reds, the Communists openly denounced the United States and Chinese Nationalist intrusion in areas where the Reds had been the only force opposing the Japanese for years. Communist anger turned to the instrument of United States policy in China, the United States Marines. Chinese Communist elements fired on U.S. vehicles near Peiping on the 5th, 6th, and 28th of October 1945. Four


marines were wounded as a result of these shootings. Two more marines were wounded in a jeep patrol near Tangshan on 18 October.

EVEN MORE SERIOUS was the outbreak of near-civil war on the North China plain. Communist resistance to the extension of Nationalist control took the forms of economic blockade and of thorough disruption of the Nationalist-held portions of the line of communication. Peiping, Tsingtao, and Chinwangtao were subjected to a strict blockade, causing chaotic conditions of rising food prices to exist in those cities. Communist attacks on the Peiping-Mukden railroad, particularly in the Tang Shan-Linshi-Kuyeh area, home of the Kailan Mining Administration, had halted practically all rail traffic. Thus the stationing of marines along the Peiping to Chinwangtao section of the Peiping-Mukden railroad was of immense benefit to North and Central China. Without KMA coal from Tangshan, the cities of Peiping and Tientsin were without light, heat, power, or sanitation. Without KMA coal, the cities of Tsingtao, Shanghai and Nanking, supplied by rail to Chinwangtao and thence by water, would be faced with a halted industrial economy, with cold, darkness, and disease. Without KMA coal, the chaos of a disrupted economy, spawning ground of rebellion, would have fallen on those great cities. Marine guards along the Peiping-Mukden line* insured the delivery of coal to a large segment of China—and the delivery of coal assured the people of at least a chance for peace and reconstruction.

But the maintenance of operation of the Peiping-Mukden line was only a bright spot in the midst of darkness. Nationalist troops which had been lifted to North China at war's end were insufficient in strength to control the areas occupied by the Nationalists. There was little or no extension of Nationalist control during the last two months of 1945. The Communists, on the other hand, succeeded in holding most of what they had in China Proper and at the same time, in emphasizing the concentration of their troops in Manchuria. Gen Lin Piao, top Chinese Communist commander in Manchuria, succeeded in rallying a force of over 200,000, a force which would later effectively delay the movement of Nationalist armies along the key Mukden-Harbin line.

SIMULTANEOUS to all this military effort the United States was in the midst of a prodigious effort to bring peace to "unreconstructed" China. For twenty years the Nationalist and Communists in China had battled—their every meeting marked by bloodshed, terror, and distrust. Beneath the surface smoothness of joint American-Chinese war effort against the Japanese there brewed a witches' broth of bitterness and when allied victory was won this hidden stew boiled over. The much publicized "United Front" in China was a mockery; two days after the surrender of the Japanese, intranecine warfare flared in China. United States policy at the time dictated our support of the Government of China, but we felt that world peace required the extinction of the fires of civil war in Asia. It was to serve as "peace maker" that Gen Marshall was ordered to China. The mission—and the plans for peace evolved by Gen Marshall—were magnificent in concept. But the man and the plans were several years too late. The apparently incurable rupture between the Nationalists and the Communists came in 1941, when open warfare between the two broke out. By 1946 the United States was committed to a policy of helping the Nationalists exclusively, and it was this policy which, unforgotten by the Reds, rendered impossible the restoration of America's position as a non-partisan mediator in China's internal affair. The amazing thing about Gen Marshall is not that he failed, but that he achieved what success he did. January 1946 marked the period of Marshall's greatest esteem in China, and a feeling of cooperation was abroad in the land. The "Three Man Conference", composed of Gen Marshall, Chiang Kai Shek, and Chou En-lai, on 10 January, reached an agreement which gave much cause for hope. The agreement stated that no attempt would be made by either side to settle their differences by warfare, that no troops would be moved by either side into areas then controlled by the other—and that differences between the two in the future would be settled peaceably. An organization was established whose function and responsibility would be the supervision of the carrying out by area commanders of the agreements reached by the Nationalist and Communist representatives on the Three Man Conference, mediated by Gen Marshall. This organization was Executive Headquarters. Executive Headquarters sent out some thirty teams to various points in China where fighting threatened to

*Whose duties and problems were outlined in *On the Peiping-Mukden Line* by LtCol James D. Hittle in the June issue of the *Gazette*.



The Great Wall of China, long-standing symbol of China's venerable doctrine of strict isolationism, marks scene of a number of Communist-Nationalist clashes.

assist in the carrying out of the provisions of tripartite agreement and in the arbitration of local differences between Nationalist and Communist units.

On 11 March six liaison teams were formed from personnel of III Amphibious Corps and assigned to duty with Executive Headquarters. These "peace teams" achieved a measure of success, but complete solution of China's problems was not to come. The Nationalists interpreted the "no troop movement" clause as not applying to Manchuria and it was to this area that the bulk of the Nationalist strength was moved. The North East China Command of Gen Tu Li Ming, created to reestablish Nationalist hegemony over Manchuria, moved in a steady advance on Mukden with a token force entering the still Russian-held city on 15 January 1946. But the Russian welcome was cool, so cool in fact, that the Nationalist troops had to be kept in their barracks to avoid incidents with the Soviet soldiers then busy removing the industrial plant of Manchuria's number one industrial city. The Russians apparently believed that the industries of Manchuria constituted a threat to Russia's rear, whether in axis or allied hands.

The military potential which these industries represented was effectively removed. When China, who without Manchuria's raw materials, resources, or industries has no possible hope of an increased standard of living, saw what had happened to Manchuria and to China's plans for national reconstruction based on exploitation of Manchurian industry, she was deeply angered. The anti-Russianism, which is so characteristically Chinese, boiled to the surface. China knew she had no chance of military success against the Russians, but it was hoped that the United States would support the Chinese position. Faced with possible American opposition, the USSR left Manchuria in record time. All Russian troops except those in the Port Arthur-Dairen area were later withdrawn to Siberia.

All during February 1946, the 2d Division of the 52d CNA waited outside Mukden for Russian permission to enter that city. When the Russians withdrew unexpectedly on 13 March, Mukden was a shambles. Factories had been stripped, power plants removed, light, sanitation facilities—all destroyed or rendered inoperational. National occupation followed close on the heels of Russian withdrawal, but later, in the

cities further to the northeast along the Mukden-Harbin line, the Russians pulled out prior to the arrival of the CNA thereby letting the cities fall in Communists hands, cities for which the Nationalists later had to fight.

Despite the fact that the delayed withdrawal of the Russians had afforded the Chinese Communists an opportunity to concentrate some of their best units in Manchuria, the reestablishment of Chinese Nationalist hegemony over Manchuria seemed a sure thing in the first quarter of 1946. Gen Tu Li Ming had a force of some 250,000 with which to oppose Communist Lin Piao's 80-100,000 regulars. The CNA advanced steadily to Mukden, took over that city when the Russians left, and then commenced their drive on Chang Chun, the capital of Manchuria. During the first week of April a Nationalist spearhead entered the city, but the main body of the North East China Command ground to a halt before the stubborn Communist defenses at Ssu Ping Chieh, halfway between Mukden and Chang Chun. Their main body thus stopped, the Nationalists were unable to hang on to Chang Chun, losing it to the Communists on 19 April. Almost simultaneously the Chinese Reds grabbed Harbin, the primary city of Manchuria, located on the northern branch of the Sungari River, and transformed it into a fortress still under their control at time of writing.

The Nationalists built up enough strength in Manchuria in May of 1946 to break through at Ssu Ping Chieh and retake Chang Chun. Part of their success may be due to the fact that they had captured a Communist colonel named Wang, an assistant "3" in Lin Piao's headquarters, who told the Nationalists of the weakness of Communist defenses between Ssu Ping Chieh and Chang Chun. The CNA revised its plans and took off for Chang Chun without bothering to consolidate or regroup. The Commies were set back on their heels and pushed all the way to the Sungari River before they regained their balance.

When this action was all over, the Reds were on a spot, but no less so were the Nationalists. The CNA supply line, tenuous at best, was overextended to the breaking point. It was then that the famous June 7th truce was declared; to be honored by both sides until they caught their breaths and were ready to fight again.

ALL THIS ACTION in Manchuria had a considerable effect on the zones occupied by the

Marines in China proper. The unfavorable Communist position in Manchuria was met with increased Communist activity on the North China plain and in Shantung. The Peiping-Paoting-Tientsin triangle felt the squeeze and the line of communication to Manchuria—the Peiping to Mukden railroad—was attacked repeatedly. Even as far south as Shantung the reaction to the Communists' difficulties made themselves felt. Marine troops stationed in Tsingtao soon became aware of this increased pressure.

MUCH PUBLICITY was given to the situation on the Shantung Peninsula during June. A four pronged drive by the Communists along the eastern half of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway resulted in the capture by the Reds of the important rail cities of Chiao Hsien (9 June 1946), Kao Mi (11 June) and Chimo, only eleven miles from Tsingtao on 16 June. The water well area north of the port city was threatened and attacks on the railroad resulted in its destruction. Nationalist apprehension for the safety of Tsingtao resulted in exaggerated claims as to the seriousness of the situation. The local CNA garrison commander, Gen Ting, had virtually no troops, and apparently desirous of ascertaining to what extent the Marines would lend assistance in the event of an attack on Tsingtao, staged the famous "battle of Tsingtao Harbor" in which shore guns fired into sampans later disclosed to be innocent fishing vessels, but claimed by the garrison commander to be Communist assault vessels. On 9 June, the 4th Marines and the Airfield Defense Force at Tsingtao were alerted due to the increased Communist activity around Tsingtao. The seeming gravity of the situation inspired the sending of LtCol Carl V. Larsen, G-2 of the 3d Marine Brigade to Lin I, headquarters of the Communists in Shantung. At Lin I, Col Larsen was assured that the Reds had neither intent nor desire to attack the Marine occupied city of Tsingtao. The Nationalists met the Communists' threat to Tsinan and to the railroad connecting that city with the port of Tsingtao by air lifting the 73d CNA to Tsinan from Suchow, and by waterlifting the 54th CNA to the Shantung Peninsula north of Tsingtao. These two armies drove east and west respectively in an attempt to sweep the CCF from the line of communication. But the extent of Communist domination over Shantung was not to be easily diminished; the finest troops of Communist China are those of the New Fourth, the army of Shantung.

to be concluded

In Brief

A new flag is flying on Iwo Jima—a metal one. The new emblem, a sheet metal flag with enameled stars and stripes, has been put there temporarily, since the regulation cloth flag lasts only 10 days because of the high winds that whip around the summit of Suribachi. Eventually, the metal flag will be replaced with a monument.

Naval flight training will no longer be conducted in the light biplanes commonly known as the "Yellow Perils." In the future, all students will solo in the SNJ "Texan," a low-wing monoplane with many of the aspects of modern operational aircraft. Authorities expect the change will provide the Navy with better aviators in a shorter period of time, and at less cost.

The USAF is presently making several changes in the *communications facilities* aboard its aircraft, said BrigGen Anken Brandt, USAF, recently. Latest in design is facsimile equipment, a form of visual message presentation similar to television. With this equipment airmen can receive weather maps, pictures, enemy troop locations, and printed types of information.

Preliminary work has begun on a *subterranean power plant* in Norway that is to be invulnerable to air attack. The first of its kind in the country, the plant will be bored 3000 feet back into a mountain. Having a power exceeding 180,000 kilowatts, the plant will be supplied with water through a conduit 14 miles long. Cost of excavation alone is put at \$5,925,000.

A North American P-51 Mustang equipped with *twin-ram jet engines*, one mounted on either wing, is presently undergoing flight tests. The ram jet, lacking power at slow speeds, requires another type of power plant for launching to establish an operating speed. When the jets are cut in, the speed of the Mustang is raised an additional 100 mph in a few seconds.

The *average veteran* of World War II is a young man, about 29 years of age. In a recent survey it was established that of the 14,361,000 vets, 28 percent are less than 25 years old. 33 percent are from 25 to 29 years old and 30 percent are from 30 to 39. The average age of the man still in the service is approximately 25 years.


Core drillers have reached a depth of 1346 feet in a *hole being drilled on Bikini Atoll*. The largest hole in the Pacific Islands, it surpasses the mark set 49 years ago on Futi Futi Island. The Bikini Test hole has yielded little solid core material save for a layer of limestone encountered at 200 feet. The deepest spot in Bikini lagoon is 500 feet, while the floor of the surrounding ocean is about 2½ miles below the surface.

A *prefabricated arctic shelter* designed to keep occupants warm in a 70 degree Fahrenheit temperature while the temperature on the outside is 70 degrees below, is the aim of Army engineers. The building, light enough to be transported by plane or glider, will be capable of withstanding high winds of 125 mph. Simple construction will enable unskilled men in heavy arctic clothes to assemble it without difficulty.

The Coast Guard is currently making a study of *plastic tableware* as a possible replacement for chinaware and metal trays in enlisted men's messes ashore and afloat. Not only would the plastic tableware cut down breakage and eliminate health hazards, but would also keep food warm longer than the standard metal trays.

The *Phantom*, a jet fighter plane, will be ice-tested this winter on Mt. Washington, N. H., by the Navy. The plane will be placed in a building with both ends out, thus creating a natural wind tunnel. Object of the test is to correlate engine and wing icing conditions in order to determine whether the jet engine under operating conditions or the plane's wings will ice up first.

We Must Learn to Stop Tanks



WE MARINES ARE INEXPERIENCED IN ANTI-tank warfare. Unless we devote our attention to learn that which we haven't had the opportunity to learn by experience, it may cost us dearly the moment we engage a non-Japanese enemy. Some time between the final shot on Okinawa and the next D-Day of the future, we must learn how to stop hostile tanks.

This serious deficiency in our combat experience and fighting know-how has come about naturally enough. Our erstwhile Pacific enemy

injected many new weapons and tactics into the fight; but tanks worthy of the name and armored tactics were not among them. Although tanks and armored warfare were recognized major factors in the military doctrine of all other nations, the Japanese could not, because of peculiar limitations of their national economy, manufacture and place in the field modern armored equipment in other than negligible quantities. Thus, more or less through inadvertence, we marines are probably the only contemporary military organization that has never had to face a strong tank attack. With so much else to worry about during the desperate Pacific fighting, marines quite properly gave the problem little, if any, thought. Without the impetus of necessity and with our attention absorbed in more pressing problems, we have let the antitank field lie generally dormant.

But the battles of the past have been won. And today we must prepare ourselves to fight . . . and to win. . . . the battles of the future, under the conditions of the future! This sobering task demands that we search for our weaknesses (for what was not a weakness three years ago may be one today), honestly admit them to ourselves, and apply ourselves to achieve their deliberate elimination. We have much to do. And among that which is most pressing is the job of adapting our amphibious technique, and

otherwise readying ourselves to fight an armor-strong enemy.

What is the nature and importance of the thing we must learn to protect ourselves against, the hostile tank attack? What is the likelihood of our having to face it? In order to evaluate the importance of the antitank field, let us, for a moment, analyze the tank, for the two are inseparably connected.

THE TANK is today a triple-threat weapon. It is a powerful infantry support weapon; it is

the dominant ground weapon of exploitation; and it is one of the most important of all antitank weapons.

The tank has become an invaluable infantry support weapon. It is a favorite of infantry, for it provides the closest of all supporting fires. It physically accompanies the infantryman, shares his experiences, sees what he sees, and helps him during the infantry assault, still the most grueling and dangerous feat of all warfare. The tank destroys or neutralizes the enemy's direct fire weapons, those weapons which pour aimed fire into the infantry. As tank-infantry communications and the technique of tank-infantry coordination were improved during the course of the last war, the power of the tank-infantry team increased several fold. In Europe, the last war closed with millions of infantry and thousands of infantry tanks moving on both sides. One U. S. Army infantry officer, in a recent analysis of infantry action in the European Theater, wrote that decisive infantry action seldom occurred except when tank-led! And it is today the well-established doctrine of all military powers to concentrate infantry tanks in great strength as a battering ram of steel to spearhead the infantry main effort. Thus tanks have become a normal and important part of decisive infantry action. Indicative of the importance of the infantry tank, our Army recently announced

By LtCol Arthur J. Stuart

So far the Marines have not had to face much in the way of enemy tanks. However, future operations may be against a tank-wise adversary; therefore, the Marine Corps must be ready to counter armored attacks with effective antitank weapons

its new postwar infantry division (war strength) with 150 organic tanks!

Commencing with the lightning panzer operations in Poland at the outbreak of the recent war, the tank became the major ground weapon of exploitation. It continued in that role throughout the long European War until Allied armored drives from the East and West into the German homeland brought final victory. While current doctrine calls for infantry, assisted by infantry tanks, to effect a breakthrough, it also calls for commitment of armored units through the breach against deep objectives of major importance. Such armored exploitation operations are the logical follow-up of the breakthrough and have as their goal the expansion of the local victory into a sweeping victory of many fold importance. The U. S. Army's new armored division (war strength) with 340 odd organic tanks, reflects the current importance of the tank as a weapon of exploitation.

By the close of the last war the tank had been assigned a third important role. It had excelled and replaced the tank destroyer as the standard heavy, armored, self-propelled antitank weapon. The tank destroyer evolved as a type when tanks were still armed with relatively light guns. The heavily gunned, lightly armored, faster tank destroyer was in concept designed to destroy tanks by seeking and maintaining optimum long ranges beyond effective range of tank guns. But as tank development produced heavier tanks with ever more powerful guns, the point was reached well before the close of the last war where tanks could effectively engage tank destroyers at ranges up to the maximum limits of visibility. This spelled the doom of the tank destroyer, for it had lost its basic advantage over the tank and had lost its ability to execute its basic tactical role. Thereafter the tank destroyer engaged tanks at a great disadvantage and the tank became the logical successor to its role. When it did so, it became a major antitank weapon, for of the whole family of direct fire antitank weapons, the heavy antitank gun accounted for more tank casualties than did all other types combined during the last war. Statistical analysis of tank casualties of the European Theater further shows

that the self-propelled antitank gun was several times more effective than towed guns, and that armored antitank guns were far more effective than unarmored.

• SUCH WAS the importance attained by the tank in its three major roles by the end of the last war. Postwar tank design continues to achieve rapid progress in increased gun-power and fire control, greater mobility, and better armor protection. In addition to such inherent improvements in the tank itself, broader developments of warfare indicate a future role of increasing importance. Common sense and published data on atomic explosives indicate that fully armored vehicles have characteristics which tend to reduce the effects of concussion, flash-flame, and radiations—the principal characteristics of atomic explosives. Further, it is felt by many that full scale atomic war would place greatly increased strategic and tactical emphasis on mobility.

VT fuzes, when perfected for general employ-



LtCOL ARTHUR J. STUART
was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1937 from the Naval Academy. After basic school he was assigned duty at the Naval Prison, then with the 4th Marines in Shanghai. His first billet with a tank outfit came

in 1941. He became a tank battalion commander in 1944. Participating in the Bougainville, Palau, and Okinawa campaigns, he was awarded the Bronze Star and the Silver Star. His present assignment is Chief, Special Subjects Section and Instructor in Tanks, Marine Corps Schools.



A German Tiger tank stopped by a 75mm AP in Italy. Halting a tank advance usually denotes stopping of a breakthrough.

ment by artillery, mortars, and other weapons, will tend to radically reduce the protection afforded by the familiar fox hole and trench, but will have little effect on the fully armored vehicle except perhaps to afford it a curtain of close-in protection. One must ponder this for some time for its significance to be fully felt. Armor may well increasingly provide much of the protection hitherto taken for granted in the ground.

The foregoing current trends but add to the tank's already prominent position. We have seen the increased emphasis on armor reflected in the U. S. Army's postwar infantry and armored divisions. The trend is the same in foreign armies. Let us consider, briefly, the Red Army, for it is today probably the most experienced military organization in the world in both tank and antitank warfare. The Red Army has placed ever-increasing emphasis on the tank arm. Its major infantry breakthrough operations of the recent war were lead by concentrations of thousands of infantry tanks. The breakthroughs were exploited by armored units as large as tank armies. The Red Army early developed heavy tanks and by the war's close had a ratio of one heavy to five mediums in action. Current Soviet doctrine supports a considerably higher ratio of heavies to mediums.

Thus, as a fact today, we face a military world strong in armor. If the other fellow has that with which he can hurt us badly, then, it has always been the Marine way to learn his game and beat him at it. The other fellow has tanks and we have got to learn how to stop them.

For, as the tank has gained, and continues to

gain, importance, the antitank field likewise gains correspondingly in importance. Whereas we have had limited experience in the employment of tanks, we have had virtually no experience in antitank warfare. The Red Army, so experienced in antitank combat, has come to attach so much importance to it that Red Army Field Regulations state "The defense is primarily antitank defense!" In other words, the Soviets' opinion seems to be that

to stop the tanks invariably leading the hostile infantry main effort is a major step towards stopping the hostile infantry and *preventing a breakthrough*, and should a breakthrough come, then, to stop the hostile tanks is the first step towards *containing it* and minimizing hostile gains.

¶ BUT THE ANTITANK field is of broader importance than simply as a part of the defense. It is, in attacking an enemy strong in tanks, a necessary requisite of successful offensive operations. The tank arm is the fibre of the mobile defense, so much more difficult to overcome than the purely static defense. The coordinated powerful counterattack by hostile mobile reserves spearheaded by tanks constitutes perhaps the greatest single threat to the success of the normal attack.

Our airborne leaders have repeatedly stated that one of the greatest problems of airborne warfare is that of how to stop hostile armor; they have consistently emphasized that an airborne force without an effective antitank defense can not survive.

There are many similarities between airborne operations and amphibious operations and it is equally important that an amphibious force have an effective antitank defense. The problems and difficulties of achieving a strong antitank defense for an amphibious force during the crucial early phases of a landing appear to be almost as great as during the early phases of establishment of an airhead. The same difficulties of coordination, the same dearth of heavy equipment, and the same vulnerability of the rear with its vital land-

ing areas, exist in both cases.

What is the nature, then, of this new field which we must learn? First, it is difficult. There is no easy way to gain antitank protection; it simply cannot be had cheaply. It constitutes a field of specialized employment of all the arms. Beyond this, all arms must be coordinated in their special role, and the execution or conduct of an effective antitank defense poses one of the most difficult of all problems of control and coordination. A little too late is much too late; to do nothing plays into the enemy's hands. And what must be done must be done under heavy fire. A careful study of the antitank lessons of the last war shows that courage and intuition are not enough—and that skill, precise control and coordination, and adequate equipment are required as well.

We have got to study the thing we must learn to stop, the strong coordinated tank attack. It is an attack inherently characterized by suddenness, surprise, and great power. Tanks can be concentrated relatively quickly for the tank attack or tank counterattack. They will be concentrated at the point of the enemy's selection. The attack will come on a relatively narrow front and its decisive phases will be of relatively short duration. It will often be preceded by artillery and aerial bombardment. The hostile tanks will be followed by infantry, covered by infantry, and assisted by infantry weapons. They will be assisted by direct support artillery and aviation. Tanks themselves will concentrate their tremendous firepower on our forces at the point of contact, which the enemy will have made every effort to determine in advance, as well as the exact nature and disposition of our local forces.

THE TANK ATTACK, whether it be the case of a tank company or battalion spearheading an infantry drive or the thrust of a large armored unit, thus constitutes an unusually great concentration of firepower and fighting power in a local sector designed to overcome all resistance in that sector. It seeks to achieve decisive results before other more distant weapons can react while local defending weapons fight greatly outmatched on terms of extreme fire inferiority. The enemy will make every effort to isolate the local area of attack by employing covering fires of all types. He will attempt to literally smother our local defending forces, to neutralize them to be virtually incapable of resistance, and finally to overrun and destroy them. That is essentially the nature

of the thing we must learn to protect ourselves against.

What is the nature of the antitank defense we must develop to stop this type of attack? Let us start with a fundamental common sense approach to the problem.

We need first to learn all we can about tanks and tank tactics, if for no other reason than to be thoroughly familiar with this problem of stopping the enemy's tanks. We need this knowledge to evolve a sound antitank doctrine and have confidence in it.

Then over and above all matters of technique, the nature of our antitank defense must in essence provide a strong counter concentration of tank stopping power at the point of the hostile tank attack.

The most favorable conditions possible must be created through maximum employment of passive antitank measures. In the defense, maximum use must be made of antitank mine-fields and both natural and artificial antitank obstacles of all types to slow, weaken, and canalize hostile tanks. We must do the same thing in the attack. We must improve on the Russian technique of throwing out a screen of controlled mines to protect intermediate objectives within a matter of minutes after seizure in anticipation of the inevitable tank-led German counterattack. We must learn to employ all types of passive antitank measures to gain time and develop favorable conditions for employment of our active antitank weapons.

While passive defensive measures are important, we must not place undue reliance upon such measures alone. Passive antitank defenses are generally capable of being breached, bridged, or by-passed. Tank dozers, bridge-laying tanks, and other more elaborate equipment have been developed for that very purpose. Passive defenses but assist the functioning of the active antitank defense.

In active antitank defense, each arm must develop streamlined time saving techniques specifically designed to be most effective against the hostile tank attack. Necessary speed and precision can only be achieved through the evolution of a definite doctrine or role for every arm in antitank defense and through careful prior training in that role to achieve near-automatic performance.

Let us consider first the antitank problem of the infantry arm. Infantry depends, in the final analysis, on other arms for overall antitank pro-

tection very much as it depends on other arms to provide counterbattery fire. It is the least suited of all arms to fight tanks, for the tank was specifically developed and designed to destroy infantry. The tank gun is far more powerful than the heaviest infantry gun. Tanks can concentrate fighting power to a far greater degree than permitted infantry because of its dispersion limitations. And finally, the nature of combat is unfavorable to infantry as hostile tanks will concentrate at the point of their selection to attack only a local sector of infantry, which must defend all sectors. Infantry is thus typically dispersed in relatively thin dispositions; and infantry's ability to react, to move, or to move its fire—in short to counter-concentrate—is relatively limited. Such antitank weapons as infantry possess—bazookas, recoilless types, etc., have severe limitations. Although they are tank killers on the proving ground, they have three weaknesses: they are manned by exposed personnel; they are direct fire and so can be observed and their fire returned; and finally, in the normal infantry defense there aren't enough of them at any one place and they have such limited battlefield mobility that they can seldom be moved to oppose a tank attack after its commencement.

Perhaps the most serious weakness, that of exposed personnel, requires that unprotected antitank gunners must function in the face of, and at the time of, the extremely heavy fires of attacking hostile tanks and their supporting fires, if they are going to function at all! Regardless

of courage or spirit, the flesh can't stand. We saw that eloquently proven in the Pacific by the failure of fanatical Japanese suicidal tank-hunting teams. It is a lesson, proven in the Pacific and upheld by the record in Europe.

All such short range direct fire weapons are by their nature subject to being seen themselves by the hostile tanks when they open fire, if not before. From then on out it is a close range direct fire duel with tremendous fire superiority and every other advantage on the side of the attacking tanks. This situation is but aggravated by the fact that such infantry weapons as happen to be in the zone of hostile attack are relatively few and those outside the immediate zone are characteristically rendered incapable of assistance. In summary, the infantry antitank weapon is one of emergency self-protection. Its proper role is to provide local protection against remnants of hostile armor surviving the fires of heavier antitank weapons. That is the theoretical and practical extent of its capabilities. Barring revolutionary new developments, it will probably be the extent of its capabilities in the future.

THE ROLE OF ARTILLERY in antitank defense is potentially an important one indeed. The Russians achieved considerable success of artillery in direct fire barrages followed by the employment of artillery in direct fire as a final phase. The field gun, as an indirect fire weapon, has great inherent antitank value for the hostile tank can be struck by it but the hostile tank cannot

strike back; it cannot turn its massed fire power on it as it can on the direct fire infantry antitank weapons. Although artillery has this tremendous advantage over tanks by virtue of its indirect fire, it has a serious limitation. Indirect fire inherently lacks point accuracy and a direct hit by medium or heavy caliber artillery is required to seriously damage or destroy a modern tank. This does not mean that artillery is unimportant in antitank warfare. Quite the contrary. But it does require

Tank destroyers, successful in first part of the war, were later less effective than tanks in dispatching enemy armor.



that it be massed to deliver concentrations of unprecedented density. We must perfect our techniques of massing fires, for the higher the density of fire the more effective the barrage will be. Antitank barrages must be carefully pre-planned for the timing and placement of such barrages pose many problems. Broadly speaking, every gun within range must be concentrated on the hostile tank approach or we but play into the enemy's hands in allowing him to accomplish our piecemeal destruction. This type of artillery employment, with its critical time factors, calls for the development of the most precise control of massed fires. It calls for the pre-planning and the automatic execution of an artillery antitank doctrine which we must develop in detail.

• **LIKE ARTILLERY**, our own tanks to function effectively as antitank weapons require maximum time factors achieved by the antitank warn-

"... Postwar tank design continues to achieve rapid progress in increased gun-power and fire control, greater mobility and better armor protection . . . that reduce the effects of concussion, flash-flame, radiation — after-effects of the atom bomb . . ."

ing system. They must employ mobile tactics to move in strength from central dispositions out to any threatened sector prior to the enemy's arrival. They must take up previously reconnoitered firing positions, providing maximum ground and aerial concealment, hull defilade, and good fields of fire, preferably providing fire at the flank of the hostile armor. They must utilize their mobility to move from position to position. Our tanks must be flexibly employed in strength, for here again, a little is not enough. We must devise a doctrine for control of our tanks in antitank defense at division, corps, or the very highest workable level, in order that we can counter-concentrate sufficient strength to meet and destroy the hostile tank concentration. Decentralized control clearly plays into the enemy's hands by permitting our piecemeal destruction. Thus, if the enemy concentrates his tanks to attack one unit of a corps, all tanks of the corps must, if needed and physically capable of the movement, be employed to repel the attack, rather than have the tanks of units not attacked stand idly by only to see the enemy overrun neighboring sectors, out-flanking their own positions, and later find themselves attacked from the flank or rear or forced to withdraw under most unfavorable conditions.

Because the same Marine tanks that must provide antitank protection are, broadly speaking, also employed to support our infantry, we must develop a positive system of dual tank control. Such a system of control must be flexible to provide maximum antitank protection interference with the important infantry support mission. A "graduated system of antitank alerts" is a possible solution. Such a system might well include an "alert" calling for the automatic antitank employment of tank reserves under direct control of the division or corps tank officer, another "alert" to automatically provide coordinated employment of the tank reserve plus the tanks in support of the threatened infantry regiment's sector, and an "alert" calling for the automatic coordinated employment of all tanks. The record proves the great value of direct artillery and air support to tanks in tank versus tank action. Tank-borne artillery forward observers and forward tactical air controllers, with direct

communications, appear to be a "must" for our tanks in the antitank role.

• **NAVAL GUNFIRE** is the Marine Corps' artillery during the critical period to the landing of our field artillery. Although it is highly effective in an antitank role in delivery of direct fire, it is of very limited effectiveness in delivery of indirect fire. This is not good enough, for a smart enemy will give our naval gunfire support ships only fleeting glimpses of his tanks. We must make naval gunfire also an effective indirect fire antitank instrument. Called naval gunfire support must be initiated earlier during the beach assault; if necessary, with NGF spotter personnel embarked in tanks or other armored communication-observation vehicles. Techniques must be perfected to provide direct naval gunfire support to our tanks in their antitank role, at least until artillery becomes operative ashore. This may involve the initiation of tank-borne gunfire spotter personnel and direct tank-ship communications. Beyond this, in indirect fire the antitank value of naval gunfire, like artillery and tanks, will vary directly as its over-all flexibility and ability to mass is increased. We must strive to shorten existing time factors required to mass the fires of our fire support ships.

AVIATION has been proven to be a valuable antitank arm. Aviation is of vast indirect importance in strategic bombing, invaluable in striking hostile tanks in assembly areas, in defiles, and in striking supply trains of armored units. It can slow or stop the over-road movement of armor. Its observation function is vital. But to date, aviation has been of far greater value in thus striking tanks prior to inception of the tank attack than it has been as a tactical antitank weapon once the hostile attack is launched. This has been due to the fact that we have lacked an aerial weapon, heavy enough to knock out a tank, that has either sufficient point accuracy or sufficient density of area fire to hit moving deployed tanks. Development of a homing bomb of a type rendering counter-measures difficult is needed; or a rocket of greatly increased accuracy may become the long sought effective aerial antitank weapon. In addition, we must streamline our present close air support technique to increase aviation's effectiveness as a tactical antitank weapon. Existing time factors required to obtain a close air support strike simply won't do—the hostile tank attack would be over! Like naval gunfire, we must achieve continuous called close air support throughout the landing commencing at H-hour, if necessary by employment of armored communication-observation vehicles to carry our forward tactical air controllers. And, as a proven factor of great value, we have to perfect direct air support of our own tanks in their tank destroyer role. This will probably require tank-borne forward tactical air controllers and direct tank-plane communications.

Centralized control, to provide flexibility and the ability to mass, constitutes the all important characteristic of the special antitank functions of the several arms. Its workability depends directly upon adequate warning time. Therefore, we must bend every effort to achieve an effective antitank warning system. Marine intelligence must become tank-minded; we must develop and utilize every means of ground and aerial observation, including radar observation; we may find it necessary, as the Red Army has, to set up special antitank communication nets. Whatever is necessary must be done for we will never have a good antitank defense without a good antitank warning system!

IN ALL THE HISTORY of antitank warfare the error most consistently and frequently recurrent is failure to bridge the gap between proving

ground or theoretical capabilities of weapons and their actual capabilities *in the face of and under the conditions of the hostile tank attack*. There is only a relatively brief period during the course of the hostile armored attack during which the Marine antitank defense will either succeed or fail. It must be able to function under the difficult conditions existent at that time. The enemy will seek at least temporary air and artillery superiority to support his coordinated tank attack. He will lay down intense direct fire from his tanks and infantry weapons in the actual zone of attack. He will seek to drive our aviation and aerial observation from the air; he will seek to neutralize our artillery by counter-battery and air attack. He will seek to blind our observation and disrupt our communications. We must recognize these things and overcome them. The antitank functioning of the several arms must in this sense be shockproof. It must have staying power. This is a big order and may involve duplicating observation and communications; it may require large scale smokescreen operations to cover our tank movements, artillery gun positions, etc.; and it certainly will involve the most skillful utilization of protective terrain features in the location of command posts, communication centers, etc. The problem is to prevent a breakdown in the antitank functioning of the several arms during the very period that it is so vital that they function, to adapt them to specifically function under those adverse conditions. We must eliminate the frequent and often fatal miscalculation of the past between the theoretical and the practical. The necessity of keeping this important factor ever in mind in antitank warfare can not be over-emphasized.

But our problem goes beyond the development of special antitank functions and techniques for the several arms and the proofing of the several arms to execute those functions under the conditions that they must fight. We must achieve the coordination of the antitank roles of all arms. Thus the antitank roles of tanks, infantry, aviation, artillery, and the passive antitank functions of engineers must be carefully coordinated into one integrated defensive system. It is obvious that the interrelationship of the detailed functions of the several arms will vary in the attack, in the defense, by day and by night. It will vary in every particular situation dependent upon terrain, the enemy situation, and our own situation. The coordination of the antitank defense must, in the interest of flexibility, be a function of the highest workable echelon. Our

higher commanders, and their staffs, must therefore become expert in the antitank employment of the several arms.

Coordination in planning will require expert judgment. Coordination in the execution phase will prove a major task of command because of the two criteria to success of all antitank effort—*mass and speed!*

There is one thing more that must be added to the scope of our already gigantic task. We must adapt all this to the Marine specialties. We must adapt the special antitank functions of the several arms, their proofing to remain operative under contingent unfavorable conditions, and their coordination—to base defense and the amphibious attack.

The field of base defense poses many special problems, foremost of which is the extreme importance of proofing our antitank defense to function effectively under conditions of violent attack.

The adaptation of a strong antitank defense to all phases of our amphibious attack poses even more difficult problems. Yet, in the armor-strong military world today, it is vital that we achieve continuous positive antitank protection for all phases of the amphibious attack, commencing with the ship-to-shore movement and first assault echelons ashore.

Our troops still move ashore in landing craft or vehicles providing concentrated lucrative targets, and they are yet able to develop only a fraction of their fighting power while so exposed. Our protective measures, the LVT(A) and air and naval gunfire scheduled post H-hour isolation fires to protect this inherently vulnerable phase of the amphibious attack were specifically developed to be effective against a Japanese infantry defense. They were most effective against such a defense. But will they, without extensive modification, be equally effective against an armored defense?

Our amphibious attack was not designed to overcome such a defense and the characteristics of the LVT(A), the density of our NGF isolation fires and relatively cumbersome and slow procedures for massing naval gunfire, the relative lateness of landing our artillery, tanks, and heavy weapons, the relative lateness of initiation of called air and NGF support ashore—all these things reflect their background of development to cope with a hostile infantry defense. As we prepare ourselves to fight an armor-strong enemy, as we must today, it is necessary that we thoroughly scrutinize, and modify as necessary,



Two-man bazooka team. Infantry's antitank weapons are largely last ditch expedients.

our amphibious doctrine and technique.

To adequately protect our landing forces against the threat of hostile tank attack we must achieve a continuous antitank defense commencing with H-hour. And the nature of the threat precludes decentralization and dictates maximum centralization of control to achieve requisite massed protective fires of maximum speed and flexibility. Decentralization, always so tempting in landing operations, is the antithesis of efficiency in antitank defense. The nature of the co-ordinated tank attack renders it simply a case of united we stand, divided we fall.

That we are singularly lacking in experience in the antitank field and have relatively little knowledge of it, is a factual condition. While this has not constituted a weakness in the past, if it continues, it may constitute a grave fault in the future.

We saw the enemy fall helpless before the guns and flame of our tanks. We know the tank is inherently designed to strike without being struck. It is a weapon which very definitely requires a defense against it, with the cost of failure annihilation. Against the Japanese we had a virtual monopoly of these powerful weapons. That is no longer the case.

In conclusion, we must above all guard against complacency nurtured by our consistent successes of the Pacific War, for it is historically fatal for a victorious military organization to adopt the frame of mind or psychology that it has learned enough in winning any particular war to win the next one. We must, rather, always realize that we do not know enough, now, to win again! We have much to learn, including how to stop tanks.

US MC

The Marines in the Pacific War

Chapter 16

GUAM: A CAMPAIGN OF MANEUVER

THE MEN OF THE III PHIB CORPS REMAINED aboard their ships in the offing, not having a very good time, while the early Saipan fighting was going on. They were fulfilling the function of floating reserves for emergencies which had originally been that of the 27th Division. By 25 June two things were evident; the enemy's Tapotchau position had been penetrated, so that the III Phib would not be needed on Saipan—and it would be some time before the Guam attack, to which the corps had been dedicated, could begin. That day the transports with the 3d Division steamed back to Eniwetok to let the men stretch their legs ashore, and a week later the 1st Provisional Brigade followed.

In the meantime Gen Geiger and Adm Connolly had begun a series of conferences with Turner and Holland Smith. The talks lasted for a week, going right up and down the ladder of everything that had happened and revising all plans in the light of the Saipan experience. Plans for the capture of Guam were nothing new in the Marine Corps, of course; it had been obvious for many years that the island must fall at once in the event of a Japanese war and the means of its recovery had long been a favorite operation in those imaginary conflicts that are fought across sheets of paper at the Marine Corps Schools. But all these older plans had been thrown out the window as early as April of 1944, when III Corps down at Guadalcanal began considering the reconquest of Guam as a practical proposition. The old plans had the fundamental defect of not being able to predict the progress of invention. That is, they provided only for landings from boats on the few and restricted sand beaches, whereas the appearance of amphtracs and DUKWs (the rubber tires of the latter had, to the surprise of many Marine officers, proved quite impervious to coral) made it possible to consider going right in over the reefs.*

By Fletcher Pratt

The Saipan experience had shown the need of changes almost as basic in the April plan. It had been made in anticipation of a Japanese force of less than 10,000 men on Guam; that figure was now more than doubled in view of the underestimate at Saipan; and being doubled, it was clear that a force of the Marine division and a brigade was not enough, not even if the brigade lacked very little of being a division in size.

Gen Geiger asked for the 77th Army Division (MajGen A. D. Bruce) and got it, but as this division had no training in amphibious action, it was contemplated that the Marines would take the beaches and the Army men be brought in as soon as there was enough room to maneuver. On Saipan neither air nor naval bombardment had eliminated anything like the proportion of fixed defenses they should, considering how incomplete those defenses turned out to be after we got hold of them. Aerial reconnaissance showed that while the long fighting for the more northerly island was going on, the Japs had been working like mad on their Guam positions. The bombardment plans were stepped up as radically as they had been between Tarawa and the Marshalls, and not only stepped up in quantity but also in deliberation, which is to say that instead of firing at general areas the ships were to take their time and go for exact targets, individual gun positions and pillboxes.

The matter of getting quicker unloading of the supplies received a good deal of attention, most of the bulk cargo going aboard LSTs, with large numbers of DUKWs to serve them and tractor cranes at the top of the load to handle packages as soon as the beach was touched. Finally there was a major change in the artillery ashore. Always before the Marine guns had come late to the landing because it was necessary for them to wait till the infantry had passed the minimum limit of howitzer range before opening fire—a matter of anywhere from 300 to 750 yards, depending on elevation. This left an ugly gap through what was normally the toughest part of a defense system which the Marines must cross

*Indeed, it was the obvious tactical difficulties of making a Guam landing without such vehicles, as developed in the mimic wars, that led the Marines to insist upon the invention of the amphtrac, which they described in advance as "the strategic surprise of the next war."

without help from their guns, the gap in which the 23d Regiment had had its trouble on Saipan. Gen Del Valle, who had the artillery, worked out the scheme of putting in guns early, letting those of formation A fire to the flank in front of formation B, while B's cannon similarly obtained range enough to cover A's advance by also firing off at an angle.

This was carried so far, indeed, that the 155s of III Corps Artillery were scheduled to land behind the 1st Provisional Brigade at the more southerly of the two sets of beaches and open fire forthwith, 12,000 yards across the angle of the island into the rear of the positions opposing the advance of the 3d Division between Adelup and Asan Points in the north. The Brigade itself would go ashore between Bangi Point and the little town of Agat, facing the tall hill mass of Mt Alifan.

Between the two beaches lies Apra Harbor, formed by a pair of rocky fingers projecting from the western coast of Guam. The southern finger is Orote Point with its big airfield, the town of Sumay and the area where the old Marine garrison used to be. Gen Turnage's 3d Division would anchor its left flank defensively toward the interior island and Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd's Brigade its right flank. The two would then work toward each other to clear the harbor and Orote. In all probability the 77th would be landed to cover the Brigade's rear since Orote was a strong position. The northern point around the harbor is not really a point at all, but an island named Cabras. Intelligence did not think it was or could be heavily fortified. Except for small elements to take that island the 3d Division, like the 77th, would be facing inland in preparation for whatever operation could be undertaken there.

Gen Geiger was by no means sure about these future operations and had made no specific plans for them. In fact, even the plan given was not hard and fast beyond the point of getting the division and the brigade ashore before the 77th came in. He wanted everything as flexible as possible, a trick he had learned as an air officer. He remarked that he could establish a beach-head all right but whether he could break out

of it was somewhat problematical.

Of course that did not matter in the early stages. Apra Harbor and Orote Field were the essential points. East of the latter, at the center of the island, tall Mt Tenjo rises and from its slopes on to the southern coast Guam is one mass of wild cliff-strewn high jungle country, while to the north Tenjo falls away into elevated, rolling plateau, not very rough. A good deal of the future of the operation would depend on which of these areas the Japanese chose for their stand. Late photos from Saipan-based planes showed that the enemy had obstructed both sets of beaches with obstacles quite as formidable as those at Tarawa and much more numerous.

II

THE OFFICER IN CHARGE of the Guam defenses was LtGen Sho Takashina, nominally commander of the 29th Division, one of those formations organized in 1941 when war with the United States had been decided upon. It had received field training in Manchuria for three years before being ordered down to island defense in the early part of 1944. In a practical sense the division now amounted to the 38th Infantry Regiment and some headquarters troops. Its tanks, most of its artillery, the transport unit, and nearly all the 18th Infantry Regiment, which formed the remainder of the division, had all fallen sacrifices to American submarines on the way down. The 50th Infantry also belonged to the division and had also suffered losses; what was left of it was on Tinian. There was also an Independent Mixed Brigade, the 48th, of MajGen Shigematsu, theoretically containing four battalions, but it was really made up of scraps and patches of formations that either had been diverted during the spring command troubles or had been partly lost at sea. It amounted to 2,811 men, which is about the force of a good regiment. There was also an Independent Mixed Regiment, the 10th, likewise understrength, with a variety of small units partly or wholly rescued after torpedoings, which brought the total force of Army troops on the island up to some 13,000. There had been more, but a couple of battalions had attempted to obey General Saito's orders to

Part XIV: Subsequent to a systematic bombardment from sea and air the III Corps and supporting troops went ashore on Guam. Their primary objectives were strategic Orote Peninsula and its airstrip, Apra Harbor and the towns along the coast

reinforce him on Saipan in the fading days of June, had been caught on the sea by American planes, badly shot up and marooned on Rota.

The naval personnel were about 5,500 strong, mainly one of the normal naval defense units. Its commander was only a captain, so much outranked by Gen Takashina that the command question did not arise and the naval men co-operated almost as fully as though they had been soldiers. Their primary interest in any case was the defense of Orote Point and the installations covering Apra Harbor. They manned several batteries of excellent naval 6-inch in the area and had good concreted positions around the airfield and the former U.S. Marine reservation. Along the western shore of the island to the south of Orote the defenses were in the hands of two battalions of the 38th Regiment, which could call on the 10th Independent Mixed, stationed among the mountains to the rear. With it were three three-gun batteries of 6-inch, well emplaced, and a variety of smaller pieces all along the beaches. Time and materials were lacking to build a proper series of beach defenses as ordered by Gen Saito, but each individual unit prepared its own positions, digging in under tree roots or in cliff faces. The labor troops both here and further north did excellent work in setting up antiaircraft obstructions below the waterline, mostly in the form of barbed wire and coconut log cradles filled with crude coral lumps. A continuous line of trenches paralleled the beach from Agat to Faipi Point with communications trenches leading back to cave positions. At Gaan Point at the center of this area the 38th had managed to build into a hill an excellent concrete blockhouse holding two 75s and a 37 and with a roof four feet thick.

■ NORTH OF APRA HARBOR and including the main town of Agana Gen Takashina took his own station with the remainder of the 38th Regiment, the 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and the various scattered formations. It seemed to him that this was the place where the Americans were most likely to land. He had another good battery of 6-inch concealed in the face of Chonito Cliff where it would bear right down the coast line. The beaches down the shore were defended not only with obstacles but also by small mines, of which there was a good supply. Land mines unfortunately were short, but after the air battle of 19 June construction was stopped on the new field in the plain east of Agana

and the supply of aerial bombs and torpedoes were emplaced along roads and in various defense positions, fused as mines. The general issued careful instructions that the artillery was not to reply to naval gunners but to reserve its fire for good infantry targets.

On 7 July Takashina's fortifications officer returned from a wide trip of inspection and expressed himself to the general in terms of high dissatisfaction.* The positions, except in the area of the naval troops, had been constructed without proper materials or engineering supervision. Although they were mutually supporting to a certain extent, the main reliance of the defense must be placed in infantry action and in the heavier guns. The soldiers who had built most of the positions appeared to be more interested in concealing themselves than in placing their weapons where they would do the maximum damage to the attackers and as a result the apertures were small and the fields of fire very restricted. The fortifications man recommended that the whole system be revised; but the very next morning the Americans began to bombard so earnestly that there was no time.

III


■ EARLY ON THE MORNING OF 8 JULY the cruisers *Wichita*, *Minneapolis*, and *St. Louis* ran past the northern beaches, shelling points ashore, while planes from *Corregidor* and *Coral Sea* began work on the fortifications between Agat and Faipi Point. That afternoon Close-in Connolly, in general charge of the operation, fixed the 21st as W day, while ships and planes knocked off bombarding so the air photographers could make comparison shots to see what had been hit. This was the daily program for the next two weeks, with the number of firing ships increasing steadily, three battleships on the 12th, two more carriers on the 13th, another battleship and carrier with destroyers for the next day and so on up. Connolly lived up to his name; had them closing in till the reefs became dangerous and they were firing from the 40mm. It was all aimed shooting with batteries being checked off as they were destroyed. Three big coast defense guns were thus knocked out on the 16th, four antiaircraft guns on the 18th, eight more defense guns and an antiaircraft battery on the 19th. The five towns in the area—Agana, Piti, Tepungan, Asan, Agat — were systematically razed with heavy shells, which was too bad for the Chamor-

*We do not know his name; it was obliterated on the only surviving copy of the Japanese records.

ros of the island, but there was no point in letting the Japs make fortresses of buildings, as they were sure to do.

On W minus 3 underwater demolition teams moved in in broad daylight, not only against the chosen beaches but enough others to make the enemy do some guessing. They had destroyers and LCI rocket gunboats in close support. As soon as so much as a machine-gun opened up against the divers these ships plastered it with projectiles of every calibre in the book. Only one man of these demolition teams was killed; they took out 640 obstacles at the north (Asan) beach and over 300 at Agat in the area of the southern landing, with 377 mines at the two beaches together. That night the ships fired star shell all through the dark to keep the Japs from planting new obstructions.

H hour was 0830; at both beaches the troops went ashore exactly on schedule. The earliest report that reached the flag was that the strafing P-47s had shifted targets 1,000 yards inland and that the marines were moving towards the vegetation line standing up and walking. It was not quite as easy as that sounded; there was still a good deal of fire left in the enemy at the Asan beaches, where the 3d, 21st, and 9th Regiments had gone in abreast. The latter two landed with one battalion at a time as their beaches were restricted; the 3d had two battalions in the initial wave. The fire came from the latter's flank, the left, where Adelup Point just out beyond the landing area to form Chonito Cliff and the sheer steep headland of Fonte overlook all from the south. The Japs had remanned a couple of pretty heavy guns in Chonito's face; used machine guns from the



Point; and had a lot of mortars in the rugged reverse folds of Fonte.

Asan, completely pulverized and empty even of dead Japs, lies as it were at the bottom of the bowl, of which Fonte Hill forms the outer lip. The mortar fire arched over to the beach line, pounding both the 3d and 1st Regiments there, and most especially their reserve battalions. The assault formations had worked through the danger area while the Japs were still numb from the effects of the preliminary shelling and the 4,500 rockets that had been dumped on the position. Now these assault formations sifted through a region of rice paddies and up the inside of the bowl.

By night the right wing of the 21st was well

forward on the rugged face of Fonte, linking up with Col Edward A. Craig's 9th Marines, who had early reached their phase line against insignificant resistance. From this point the line of the 21st bent back to its left at a right angle to connect with the 3d, which had nowhere been able to reach the assigned positions and all afternoon had been locked in a close flame-thrower and grenade fight with mortar shells coming down continually. The Japs beyond the Fonte crest* were so close that during the night the men of the 21st could hear the click as they dropped mortar shells in their pieces, but there was no way to get at them, since Fonte faces the attackers with verticals that nothing but a cockroach could climb. Yet on the whole Gen Turnage could be satisfied with his day. His over-all casualties were light, the new unloading method was working in a pleasing manner, and in the direction of Apra Harbor, which was the critical flank, it looked as though he could progress readily enough.

THE 1ST PROVISIONAL BRIGADE was made up of the 22d Regiment that had been at Eniwetok and a new 4th Regiment built from the Raider Battalions and parachutists after the old 4th was removed from the lists on Bataan. The brigade went across the beaches with two battalions of the 4th abreast on the right, two battalions of the 22d abreast on the left, the boundary between the two being that Gaan Point where the Jap 38th Regiment's big blockhouse was. The structure had been well hidden, not spotted by the photo interpreters, nor bombed. Further back in the rising ground there were a number of enemy's 70mm battalion guns, with a single big piece still alive on Orote Point and another on Bangi. All these guns opened up as the amphtracs rushed in and the pieces on the projecting points enfiladed the beach from both directions. Ten of the vehicles were hit and there was blood on the sand, but the destroyers and planes took care of the guns at Orote and Bangi as soon as they showed their positions, the 70mm cannon had but narrow fields of fire and only the big blockhouse was a serious nuisance.

The Marines found an excellent Jap trench system, but unmanned, the naval guns and 4,500 rockets having driven the enemy back to his holes. Machine gun and mortar fire from those holes could be legitimately described as heavy. Neither could the amphtracs work 1,000 yards

inland before discharging (the Marines were always trying this idea throughout the Pacific and it never worked); the ground inland from the beach was pediculous with mines, antitank ditches, and obstacles. But the attack was so heavy and in such expert hands that, notwithstanding all difficulties, it broke through the beach lines with hardly a check. By 1034 the assault troops were 1,000 yards inland, the reserve battalion of the 4th was already ashore and working on the bypassed bunkers and tanks were in. Three hours later the Gaan Point blockhouse had been taken and brigade command was on the beach.

IT WOULD SEEM to have been very nearly this early in the game that Gen Geiger decided to put the 305th Regiment from the 77th Division here and to follow it with the remainder of the Army division as soon as the unloading areas could stand the pressure. The attack on this southern flank was definitely moving and by twilight had already taken one of the peaks of Alifan. It is a good principle of tactics to throw one's weight behind the thrust that promises a breakthrough, and an additional reason in this case was that Guam was large enough for a war of maneuver so it was important to fix the enemy in position.

Most of the 305th landed, then, before dig-in for the night was ordered. Of course the Japs counterattacked around midnight—in the north against the 3d Regiment's line, not very vigorously, but with the greatest energy all around the perimeter of the southern beachhead. The main thrusts were along the beach from Agat and down a pass from Alifan, where the Jap 38th Regiment came against the 4th Marines behind six tanks. The tanks were all destroyed and the beachhead attackers broken up, but in the rough ground at the center of the 4th Regiment's line the enemy infiltrated as deeply as the regimental CP. There was a lot of shooting till day broke and local reserves linked up the lines again, made everything secure, and collected about 600 Jap bodies. The enemy's attack had been quite incoherent. They would walk a line of mortar bursts along till it almost reach a target, then cease fire for no reason at all. On the front of the 22d a Jap post that had held off three attacks by a full company was abandoned during the night, the enemy carrying their machine guns into our lines as though there were no Americans there at all and getting themselves all shot down for no return.

*See *Fight for Fonte*, by LtCol Robert Cushman, in the April 1947 GAZETTE.

IV

ON BOTH FRONTS the next three days were a period of adjustment, probing, and preparation. On the south the Provisional Brigade gained the full line of the Alifan crests and the ridges that run southward from them, working into the valley lying to the east. In general the brigade's right flank was pegged toward the wild mountainous southern part of the island, the advance was by the left, toward the other beachhead. Agat was engulfed and the base of Orote fairly well cut off while patrols fanned out to the east without finding much of anything. The 77th Division's troops were being assembled toward the right and by 25 July had taken over all the extensions of the old beach line. The 4th Marines had been pulled out of position to be put in with the 22d against Orote and the latter regiment was making slow, rather painful advances through an area of rice paddies too soft to offer approaches for tanks and defended by prepared positions on its far side.

In the north beachhead the 3d Regiment was unable to gain an inch against Adelup Point and the Chonito Cliff. It was counterattacked every night. All the remainder of the division pivoted on this regiment in an enormous left wheel. On the extreme right flank the 9th worked rapidly along the shores of Apra Harbor, seizing Cabras Island (where few Japs were found but an immense number of air bombs buried as mines) on 23 July, then working along the shore through the ruins of Piti Town into the rough country behind.

Col Arthur H. Butler's 21st Marines found a pair of ravines leading to the crest of the flat-top Fonte elevation and began working upward. Both gullies turned out to be simply packed with Japs, no progress was made in the first assault and the Colonel asked for a close air strike on the morning of 24 July. It was so close that there were some casualties from it in the Marine line, but the Japs in the most useful ravine were all killed to the number of 200 and by evening of that day most of Fonte was in our possession. The 9th Marines had put out patrols to link up with its own beachhead but fire from Orote turned them back along the shores of Apra Harbor.

The result of all this was that on the morning of 25 July Guam had settled down to a war on three fronts. The Provisional Brigade had Orote blocked off and was preparing to attack it the following morning. It was already clear that this

would be one of those drives by inches so common in island warfare. The Japs in there were the naval garrison force. They had been granted time to fortify every inch of the ground with pillboxes, mine fields, and mortar positions and they had by no means neglected their opportunity. It was a question of attacking and reducing each fortress in a separate operation—hand work.

A PATROL from the brigade worked along the beach this day, the 25th, and made the first contact with Gen Turnage's division, but it was only a contact for the record, not a true liaison. With their backs toward the Orote Point operation and their faces toward the rugged south central island, the 77th Division was consolidating positions and sending patrols out among the mountains. The 3d Division had one regiment (3d) still trying to work in against Adelup Point. One battalion of the regiment had been badly battered and was being withdrawn, having taken a good part of the division's casualties; the regimental commander was relieved after showing signs of overstrain, and replaced by Col James A. Stuart. Butler's 21st Regiment had been pulled toward its own left on Fonte Height and was concentrated in that direction, its right trailing off to the southwest in the direction of the 9th Marines. This regiment, out on the rim of the wheel, was swinging to get in position, facing east, trying to engulf the high mass of Mt Tenjo in the process. The wide swing of the night had produced numerous gaps in the line, one of them of 1,500 yards between the 21st and the 9th. Col Butler covered this gap with a couple of outposts on the most likely routes, similar to those frequently used in the Guadalcanal jungles.

There was abundant enemy artillery still active around Adelup and Agana. The Japs seemed to be reinforcing constantly from a central reserve somewhere in the rough triangular region Mt Tenjo-Pago Bay-Togga Bay. Gen Geiger believed the enemy main body lay in this triangle with the Adelup-Fonte fortified position anchoring its right wing on the north. His overall plan was now to bring the 77th and 3d Division into line with each other and break through the center of this enemy main body to Pago Bay. He rather expected them to make a try at getting into the southern mountains to conduct a guerrilla fight there, but as usual he kept his plans flexible. The operation order for the 26th provided only for the continuation of move-



Navy cruiser used in the bombardment of Orote Peninsula stands offshore in Apra Harbor. Orote airfield is in background, town of Sumay is on left end of strip.

ments already begun except that the 14th Defense Battalion was to set up its guns on Cabras Island and support the attack of the Provisional Brigade by firing across the harbor, while the 77th Division's artillery helped from its area.

Actually, the estimate was in error both as to the positions and the intentions of the enemy. Gen Takashina's main body was far forward, close up to the Fonte-Adelup position and he had no intention whatever of retiring to the southward if driven from there. He possessed a taste for maneuver and far more flexibility of mind than the average Jap commander. When the beachhead defense prescribed by his doctrine became impossible, he clung to the one position he could hold, at Adelup, pulled all the troops in the northern area together under his own hand and prepared for a counterattack. This took time; the terrible violence of the American shelling and air attacks had so thoroughly destroyed communications that all messages had to be taken by a runner and usually at night. It was thus 25 July before he could get his orders out and his troops arranged. In the meanwhile the naval forces had been sealed up on Orote, the two battalions of the 38th Regiment at Agat had been practically destroyed, and it proved impossible for the 10th Independent Mixed

Regiment to join from its position among the southern mountains even by the 25th. But he dared no longer delay his attack. His scouts reported the Americans closing in on Mt Tenjo from both sides and there were so many of them that they would outflank him once they got beyond that height. The attack was accordingly set for that night. It would move down the steep ridges into the northern of the two American beachheads and large bundles of demolition charges were prepared to be rolled down the slopes ahead of it. The orders were to destroy artillery particularly. Large quantities of sake were distributed and the company officers took a unanimous oath to kill as many Americans as they could before they died, then announced themselves as very happy. The naval troops on Orote were to attack their opponents at the same hour.

They were in no very good position to do so on the southern flank of that peninsula where the 4th Marines had just come into line, but on the Apra Harbor side the defense positions terminated in an extensive mangrove swamp, in which about a battalion of the Naval Defense men gathered as darkness fell. Sake was served; as it warmed the men they began to sing and to encourage each other with speeches. The pro-

ceedings were somewhat noisy and attracted the attention of observers among the 22d Marines, who realized at once that an exhibition of spiritual power would soon be forthcoming and tried to get an artillery concentration onto the mangroves. Unfortunately the wires were out and all the radio frequencies were full of Jap gabble and jamming. A brave sergeant managed to get some of the lines pieced together under fire and an intelligent captain secured momentary silences in the jamming by using French and German, which the Japs took for a new kind of code. The amount of time necessary for them to finish the sake did the rest; just as the attackers came pouring out of their swamp the shells landed crash on their heads.

They were cut to pieces, but enough survived that steel rain to reach the Marine positions and engage in a fight so close that knives, grenades, and pistols were the only weapons. The fire ran out of fuel toward dawn; as our support elements moved up they found Marine and Jap dead in many of the same fox holes, with over 300 bodies and our losses only about a quarter of that. That day the brigade swung forward by the left.

ON THE 3D DIVISION'S FRONT the case was different and a lot tougher, since the attack was made in much greater weight and to a degree came as a surprise. Part of it swept through the 1,500 yard gap between the 21st and the 9th Marines, wiping out the outposts before they had a chance to report. This swing rushed right down into the beach area, attacking the hospital and division CP, where clerks and orderlies grabbed guns and Japs were seen within 100 yards of the beach. But this river of battle had a long distance to flow, got split up among ridges, was illuminated by star shells from the ships, and by time it reached the area where it might have done real damage was only a kind of leakage of staggering, drunken Japs who could not coordinate with each other.

Part of the attack struck the 1st Battalion, 21st, right in the center, part of it the 3d Battalion of the same regiment. In the 1st Battalion area the attackers broke right through and the company that bore the brunt of the thrust could only muster 18 men the following morning. This stream of Japs went screaming down into the hollow where the battalion mortar platoon was, wiped that out also and flowed up against the regimental command post, where Col Butler was summoning shore parties from the beach

and any troops he could find to form a line. The 3d Battalion held, but with both flanks bent back into a horseshoe and the battalion commander sent a message soon after dawn that he was burying his ciphers as he expected to be carried away. But as elsewhere, distance, the late start imposed upon the enemy by their lack of good communications, and the fact that the defenders were panic-proof veterans, solved all difficulties. In the morning it was found no positions had been lost, the 9th Regiment closed onto the 21st, the divisional reserve and whatever other troops that could be found in the beachhead turned to in a grand mop-up operation and by night of 26 July, Gen Takashina's effort had cost him 3,500 men without gaining him an inch of ground.

IN A TACTICAL SENSE that was the war on Guam. Gen Takashina's command and the naval forces on Orote had alike been so badly hurt as to be deprived of the power to strike. The campaign turned into another of the fossorial operations that had been seen on Tarawa, Saipan, and Eniwetok. Yet even so it retained that curious character of maneuver, rare in the Pacific war. Orote, for example:

Nothing had happened to alter Geiger's view that the first essential was to gain the airfield and the harbor. The Provisional Brigade jumped off at the scheduled hour of 0700 on 26 July, supported not only by its own artillery and that of the corps but also some of the guns from the 77th and 3d Divisions. It had priority on all air missions. The 4th Regiment was on the left, the 22d on the right.

As soon as the drive started the latter regiment began to get heavy artillery fire, the men thought it was coming from their own guns and a pause for reorganization was necessary, as this is the most demoralizing of all beliefs that soldiers can have. Col Shapley of the 4th and Col Schneider of the 22d had a brief consultation, secured Gen Shepherd's permission for the former regiment to extend its lines a little into the latter's area and the attack went on. By 1245 the day's objectives had been reached all along the line and the troops pushed ahead toward what had been foreseen as the objective line for the following day. The pace slowed during the afternoon, both regiments having trouble—the 22d with mangrove swamps, the 4th with emplacements well dug in and so heavily mined along their approaches that tanks could not be used. But they were still well ahead of schedule

by night, when there occurred a little incident that well illustrates the character of the Guam fighting.

At midnight shells began to drop in the southern beachhead area where the tractor cranes were working. From where? An Army flash and sound ranging team—"the flash-bang boys"—on Alifan looked across the crests and picked out a spot near Sumay, too close to the forward lines for our own rear artillery to do counterbattery without hitting the 22d. The word was passed up to the front; the Provisional Brigade's artillery and a couple of close-in mortar squads took the annoying guns under fire and silenced them in 15 minutes.

Next morning the Orote attack moved on again. Now the terrain had dense undergrowth on both flanks, interspersed with swamps. All through this thorny tangle there were pillboxes covered by mines. The only real avenue of approach was along the road from Agat to Sumay, the boundary between the two regiments, and along both sides of this were the strongest Jap positions. Toward noon advance elements of both regiments were pinned down there and casualties began to pile up. Gen Shepherd ordered the tanks forward and called for more from the Army division. The latter's mediums were not yet ashore and some of their lights had been damaged in crossing the reef, but what they had, they sent, though too late to help that day. In the meanwhile, after a halt for reorganization and a call for air support, the 22d had held with its left and swung forward by the right, slugging through a network of positions and gaining some high ground south of the Sumay road. Here the Japs broke and ran, the only time they did it on Orote, but this single rout turned out to be decisive, though the 22d was now far ahead of the network of positions still detaining the 4th.

For the result was that next morning, 28 July, we had observation posts on that high ground, a great help to our artillery. The Army light tanks joined the Marine mediums; each machine had 50 yards of front to cover as they led the advance, working so close in that they were firing from ten to 15 yards range right into the slits of pillboxes. Japs who tried to get out with grenades or satchel charges were cut down by the infantry and by twilight of this day all the positions south of the airfield were taken, with 25 pillboxes knocked out.

29 July saw more fighting, not heavy, round the airfield, where the remaining Japs stayed in

their dugouts to die, and at 1530, with smoke rolling over the fields and occasional bullets still peening past, the Star Spangled Banner was broken out over the ruins of the old Marine barracks, while a musician tooted colors on a captured Jap bugle and Gen Shepherd stood at salute.

The Brigade had 2,000 casualties; it had disposed of the 5,500 Jap naval troops beside destroying the two battalions of the 38th Regiment that met it at the beaches.

VI

◆ AFTER TAKASHINA'S ATTACK Gen Geiger ordered a battalion from the 77th up under control of the 9th Marines and changed the division boundaries to give the army men a much broader front, including all of Mt Tenjo. The movement to positions took most of the day on this flank, while at the center, the 9th came forward, and the indomitable 21st, so far from being slowed by the Jap counterattack, pressed on to grip all of Fonte. These were preliminaries for the main assault; it went ahead rapidly on 28 July with Tenjo falling on the southern flank and long-contested Adelup on the north, Mt Chachao behind it and several ridges in between. The Japs seemed mostly concentrated in these northern positions, but now they stayed in caves.

Even as late as this Gen Geiger seemed still to have believed that there were considerable Jap forces beyond Tenjo in a southeasterly direction, an error for which he can hardly be blamed, since nearly every questioned prisoner said 3,000 men were in that area. Actually this was past tense information; but not even the Japanese high command knew it or knew where all the troops remaining to it were. Gen Takashina had been killed during the attack of the 28th as he tried to leave his Fonte CP, and the senior Jap officer was now LtGen Obata. That commander's communications had collapsed so completely that hardly any messengers were getting through and a good many minor units, like those in the 63-man cave, were being isolated and mopped up simply because they received no word to move.

Under such circumstances it is difficult to see what Obata could have done, but what he did do was stick to the Takashina plan of fighting a war of maneuver. He ordered a general retreat across the rolling plateau of the northern island to the region of Mt Santa Rosa, with the intention of setting up a holding position, splitting the advance, and striking into a vulnerable flank.



Marines hug beach as waves of fire come from Jap shore installations. The Japs pulled two-pronged counterattack; one routed by artillery, another a near success.

The 29th Division celebrated the anniversary of its organization while the move was in progress; "In an environment how different from last year," wrote one of its officers. "I was deeply moved. There was only a little sake to drink each other's health. The American mortar shelling is awful and a wounded man, Cpl Nakaji, committed suicide."

Our attack renewed on 30 July and punched right through to the island's eastern coast by night of the 31st, meeting almost no resistance. The 3d Division went through Agana and a tangle of wild ravines and draws where regiments and companies were often out of touch with each other, finding Japs chiefly in the form of rear guard detachments in spider pits, like those on Kwajalein. Gen Geiger assigned the Provisional Brigade to the southern portion of the island and drove his other troops hard on the track of the enemy in the north.

The advance was three or four thousand yards a day and this high country is nearly all close-knit jungle, in which little scattered knots of the enemy were encountered in fights of an endless variety. Thus the 9th Marines ran into a spider pit position beyond Agana with tank traps scattered all through it. The Japs let their vehicles and the accompanying infantry through one line without firing, then opened simultaneously from front and rear and it was quite a savage little fight until reinforcements came. On the 77th's

front a single Jap would walk slowly towards our lines at night, tempting fire so his concealed companions could shoot back at the revealed positions of our men. At another place a whole group of the enemy attacked the army men by night with hatchets.

By August 3 it was clear that no serious enemy forces were in the south; the Provisional Brigade was brought north and put in on the left of the 3d Division, which had encountered very tangled country and what looked like the beginning of an organized position west of Mt Santa Rosa. The 77th had been forced to narrow its front along the direct approaches to the same objective. In reality both divisions were approaching what Gen Obata considered his battle position. He was apparently expecting to let the right flank of the 77th advance up the lower slopes of the mountain along the coast, then cut into that wing. The messages for the counterattack never reached his men and in any case both army and Marine divisions hit the Japanese position too fast for a counterattack to move. Obata's drive turned into a series of what the 77th described as small local counterattacks, Santa Rosa was overrun in a single day and on 10 August our soldiers looked out across the Pacific from the north capes and the island was declared secure. It cost us 7,032 casualties all told, five-sixths of them wounded, 900 of them Army men.

• "SECURE" was of course, only a somewhat inaccurate metaphor for the actual conditions on Guam as of 10 August, and its use seems to have been at least dictated by the fact that Gen Vandegrift was to visit the island, so the commanders wished to get their achievement on record. For a week after the secure date it was still impossible to have lights at night in the 3d Division's command post and down to June, 1945 there were scattered groups and single Japs all over the place, doing the peculiar things those people do in emergencies. In that month a dignified Japanese major stepped out of the bush with two orderlies who took turns mopping his forehead while he sat down in the sun to talk over surrendering "the Japanese forces on Guam" with Col Howard N. Stent, a Marine language officer. The major wanted to be sure that he was surrendering to someone of properly exalted rank so that he would not lose face. Reassured on that point, he whistled 36 men from the coverts and the fighting on Guam was over.

They were the last remnants of the 13,000, but in reality of course the back of the Japanese resistance was broken when Takashina's counterattack failed at the end of the fifth day. This means that the heart of the defense was broken before that. The reason the counterattack failed, in spite of achieving strategic surprise and being made from a particularly favorable tactical position, was that it was made too late in the game. The reason for this was that the Jap communications were gone.

In fact there is no factor in the whole Pacific war more striking than this repeated pattern on islands of all shapes and sizes, of the destruction of enemy communications by naval gunfire and bombing. It happened at Tarawa and prevented the first night counterattack; it happened at Eniwetok and turned that operation into an exaggerated mopup; it happened on Saipan and deprived Saito's counterattack of all weight. The general effect was to restrict enemy mobility while giving the Marines great mobility, and this is one of the basic reasons why, in spite of the most carefully prepared positions and in spite of resistance genuinely carried to the last man, there was so enormous a disparity between the enemy's casualties and ours. Whatever the overall numbers in the field, the Marines generally had numerical superiority at the points of contact where it counts.

The Japanese defense plan, viewed in the large, gives the impression of woodleness and

stupidity, but this is really factitious; the case was that without communications no plan but the purest passive defense can be made to work. Guam presents perhaps the most visible single case of the value of the mobility conferred by naval fire. Gen Geiger's estimate of the position and the intentions of his opponent was wrong, but it made not the slightest difference in the campaign. Takashina might as well have had no plans at all and the plans he did have only made matters easier for the Americans. Of course, Gen Geiger rates good marks for keeping his own plan flexible and his troops balanced for a jump in any direction; but without the mobility conferred by his extraneous support, he could hardly have drawn the advantages he did even from this.

• IT IS NOT CLEAR that the Marines were at this time full sensible of what they were getting out of naval gunfire. They tended to think that its main value was in area firing, to drive the enemy away from the open positions where he could have made the most effective resistance, and in its effect on his morale and nervous system during the first critical half hour on the beaches. They even thought so in the case of Guam, where the shelling was strikingly effective and got rid of perhaps as many as 50 per cent of the defending guns before the landing was made. These ideas, held by many marines, were based on inspection of the Jap artillery positions after they were taken. Few of the guns were actually dismounted and few of the pillboxes blown apart. The view is a trifle narrow. A fixed gun can be put out of action quite as effectively by destroying its connection with an observation post or disposing of all its trained artillerists as by a direct hit.

One other feature of the Guam operation deserves comment for the backlight it throws on the controversy about Saipan. The 77th Division was completely green when it went into action, and on the first three nights there was a good deal of confusion in its lines from trigger-happy soldiers letting off at shadows. These soldiers learned not much less rapidly than the 3d Marine Division had on Bougainville and by time they reached Mt Santa Rosa the Army men were behaving as though they wore the world and anchor badge. The only regimental commander relieved during the campaign was a marine. The 77th was simply a well led division as the 27th had not been.

to be continued

Staffing the Peacetime Marine Division

a study in command

IN THE SPRING OF 1947 THE COMMANDANT of the Marine Corps approved the adoption of tables of organization for the units of the Fleet Marine Force for peacetime. These peacetime tables are the "J" (P) Series. A series of articles on these tables of organization have appeared in previous issues of the GAZETTE. This article is another in the series and will deal more specifically with the headquarters of the Marine division. In this article the means available in the headquarters of the division will be applied to some of the operational problems that might be encountered in training and in the conduct of amphibious operations or exercises under either peace or wartime conditions. The application of the headquarters of the division to the operational problems that are posed will be based on the principles of staff functioning as set forth in the Marine Corps Staff Manual and on the tactical principles and doctrines enunciated in Amphibious Instructions, Landing Forces, U. S. Fleets (USF-63) and Field Service Regulations, FM 100-5.

It will be recalled that the normal peacetime Marine Division is composed of 10,569 Marine and Navy personnel distributed between eleven separate battalions and two regiments, namely: a headquarters and service battalion, an engineer battalion, an amphibian tractor battalion, a medical battalion, a tank battalion, a shore party regiment, an artillery regiment, and six infantry battalions. The division headquarters is carried on the rolls of headquarters company, headquarters and service battalion, however, certain of the special staff officers of the division staff are carried on the rolls of other organizations. The Division Artillery Officer is the commander of the artillery regiment, the commander of the shore party regiment is the Division Shore Party Officer, the Division Headquarters Commandant is the headquarters and service battalion commander, the Division Provost Marshal commands the military police company, the Division Motor Transport Officer is the service company commander, the Division Post Exchange Officer commands the post exchange platoon of the service company, the tank battalion commander is the

Division Tank Officer, and the Division Engineer commands the engineer battalion. Reference to previous issues of the GAZETTE or to appropriate tables of organization will give more detailed information on the organization of the peacetime division.

Keeping in mind the organization of the peacetime division, the detailed organization of the division headquarters will now be considered. In every military organization there must be a headquarters that is capable of performing certain functions for that organization. These functions are derived from the responsibilities of the commander in his exercise of command. In small organizations the commander himself performs many of these functions but as the size of the unit increases so do the commander's duties and responsibilities. It is for this reason that, in larger organizations, a commander is provided with a staff to assist him in the performance of his duties. Many of these duties and responsibilities are set forth in the Marine Corps Staff Manual; Amphibious Instructions, Landing Forces, U. S. Fleets, (USF-63); and Field Service Regulations, FM 100-5.

The organization of the headquarters of the peacetime Marine Division is shown on pages 38 and 39. Officer personnel in each of the sections of the headquarters are shown in detail, while, the enlisted personnel have been grouped by SSN duties of a similar nature.

A comparison of the tables of organization for division headquarters with the corresponding elements of the wartime (G Series) tables reveals many areas of similarity. All of the staff sections and officers in the wartime tables are repre-

This study of the peacetime Marine Division was prepared by a group of combat-experienced officers at the request of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE. While it does not represent the official opinion of the Marine Corps, it is believed that it does constitute a careful and factual analysis of the new organization.

Organization of Division Headquarters

COMMAND GROUP

Division Command Section

- 1 Major General (Division Commander)
- 1 Captain (Aide)
- 1 Lieutenant (Aide)
- 1 Enlisted (Chauffeur)

Assistant Division Commander Section

- 1 Brigadier General (Assistant Division Commander)
- 1 Lieutenant (Aide)
- 1 Enlisted (Clerk)
- 1 Enlisted (Chauffeur)

GENERAL STAFF GROUP

Chief of Staff Section

- 1 Colonel (Chief of Staff)
- 1 Major (Secretary)
- 3 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)

G-1 Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (G-1)
- 1 Major (Asst G-1)
- 1 Captain (Asst G-1; Clfn & Assgt Officer)
- 3 Enlisted (Classification Spec)
- 3 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)

G-2 Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (G-2)
- 1 Major (Asst G-2)
- 1 Captain (OIC Target Info, FSCC)
- 1 Captain (Asst G-2)
- 1 Captain (Asst G-2; Language O; Order of Battle O)
- 1 Lieutenant (Language O; Counter Intelligence O)
- 1 Lieutenant (Photographic Interpretation O)
- 3 Enlisted (Intelligence)
- 7 Enlisted (Language)
- 2 Enlisted (Draftsman)
- 2 Enlisted (Counter-Intelligence)
- 1 Enlisted (Order of Battle)
- 5 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)
- 5 Enlisted (Photo-Interpreter)
- 14 Enlisted (Scout-Observer)

G-3 Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (G-3)
- 1 Major (Asst G-3)
- 1 Major (Asst G-3; Chief Air Obs)
- 1 Major (Asst G-3; Liaison)
- 1 Captain (Asst G-3; Trng Aids O)
- 2 Captain (Air Observer)
- 5 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)
- 2 Enlisted (Operations)
- 3 Enlisted (Draftsman)
- 2 Enlisted (Training Aids)

G-4 Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (G-4)
- 2 Major (Asst G-4)
- 1 Captain (Asst G-4)
- 6 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)

SPECIAL STAFF

Adjutant Section

- 1 Major (Adjutant)
- 2 Captain (Asst Adjutant)
- 1 Enlisted (Sergeant Major)
- 10 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)

Disbursing Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Disb O)
- 1 Major (Disbursing Asst)
- 2 Captain (Disbursing Asst)
- 3 Warrant Officer (Disb Asst)
- 22 Enlisted (Disbursing Clerk)

Motor Transport Section

- 1 Major (Motor Transport Officer)

Public Information Section

- 1 Major (Public Info Officer)
- 5 Enlisted (Correspondent)
- 1 Enlisted (Clerk)

Tank Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Tank Officer)

Transport Quartermaster Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Transport Quartermaster)
- 1 Major (Asst Transport QM)
- 9 Enlisted (Ship Loading)
- 2 Enlisted (Draftsman)

Medical Section

- 1 Captain, USN (Medical Officer)
- 1 Lt Commander, USN (Medical Asst)
- 1 Enlisted (Clerk)

Air Section

- 1 Major (Air Officer)
- 3 Captain (Fwd Air Controller)
- 3 Lieutenant (Fwd Air Controller)
- 21 Enlisted (Communication Pers)

Engineer Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Engineer)

Naval Gunfire Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (NGF O)
- 1 Lt Commander, USN (NGF Liaison Officer)
- 2 Lieutenant, USN (NGF Liaison Officer)
- 15 Enlisted (Communication Pers)

Signal Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Signal O)
- 2 Enlisted (Clerk)
- 1 Enlisted (Draftsman)
- 1 Enlisted (Driver)

Chaplain Section

- 1 Captain, USN, (Chaplain)
- 1 Commander, USN, (Asst Chaplain)
- 2 Enlisted (Chaplain's Asst)

Dental Section

- 1 Captain, USN, (Dental Officer)
- 1 Enlisted (Dental Asst)

Artillery Section

- 1 Colonel (Arty O; Coord, FSCC)
- 1 Major (Asst Coord, FSCC)
- 1 Enlisted (Operations)
- 1 Enlisted (Clerk)

Food Director Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Food Dir)
- 1 Enlisted (Mess Chief)
- 1 Enlisted (Clerk)

Ordnance Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Ordnance O)
- 1 Warrant Officer (Asst Ordn O)
- 1 Enlisted (Clerk)

Supply Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Supply O)
- 2 Major (Asst Supply Officer)
- 3 Warrant Officer (Supply Asst)
- 13 Enlisted (Supply Clerk)
- 1 Enlisted (Engineer Stock Clerk)
- 9 Enlisted (Clerk)

Chemical Section

- 1 Major (Chemical Warfare O)
- 1 Enlisted (Chemical Spec)

Inspector Section

- 1 Colonel (Inspector)
- 1 Major (Legal officer)
- 1 Warrant Officer (Asst Insp)
- 1 Warrant Officer (Auditor)
- 1 Warrant Officer (Postal O)
- 2 Enlisted (Accountant)
- 44 Enlisted (Postal)
- 2 Enlisted (Stenographer/Clerk)

Special Services Section

- 1 Lieutenant Colonel (Spec Serv O)
- 1 Captain (Welfare Officer)
- 1 Captain (Recreation Officer)
- 3 Enlisted (Spec Serv Asst)
- 2 Enlisted (Clerk)
- 1 Enlisted (Education)
- 5 Enlisted (Projectionist)

resented in the peacetime tables with one exception, the Civil Affairs Officer. However, in many of the staff sections the number of personnel has been decreased, and, as will be pointed out later when the application of the headquarters to operational problems is discussed, it will be necessary for the division commander to assign additional duties to other members of his staff so that personnel will be available to perform functions required of the headquarters. Under such circumstances the personnel assigned additional duties must be adequately trained to perform these duties so that when they are called on to function they will be able to take their place with the remainder of the staff.

The adjutant and the supply sections in the peacetime tables have more personnel assigned to them than they did in the wartime tables, apparently in compensation for the additional responsibilities arising from deletion of the regimental echelon.

Two new special staff sections have been incorporated in the peacetime tables, the air section and the naval gunfire section. In the wartime organization the Air Officer and the Naval Gunfire Officer were in the G-3 section and the Forward Air Controller and the Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer were in the assault signal company. These are now organized as separate special staff sections.

As a means of rationalizing the organization of the peacetime division headquarters, the means available in that headquarters will be applied to certain of the functions that might confront the headquarters of a division in training for and conducting amphibious operations and exercises. It is obvious, of course, that the solutions presented have not been tested by practical experience. They are, however, based on approved principles and doctrines. A commander must apply his staff to the problem at hand and make such decisions as will fit the specific situation.

In discussing the application of the headquarters to the indicated operational problems that might confront the division, the following procedure will be employed:

1. The problem will be posed and briefly discussed.
2. The primary functions required of the headquarters under the described conditions will be listed.
3. A possible solution, involving application of the means available in the headquarters of the division will be presented.

4. A brief summary will be given emphasizing the main features involved.

The primary functions required of the headquarters have been derived from various approved procedures and doctrines on military operations. These functions are tabulated by listing the staff section or officer in a headquarters who is normally charged with the primary duty of performing these functions or by listing the function itself.

In some instances no personnel have been assigned in the tables of organization to perform the function listed, so, in these cases, personnel have been listed who might be available and, with training, be qualified to perform the function as an additional duty. In each instance the commander must make the decision to assign someone to perform the function in accordance with the demands of the situation and the personnel available.

The first problem to be considered is that of training. In training a unit, every effort must be made to insure that the training is applicable to the operations that the unit may be called upon to conduct either in peace or war.

In the training cycle all elements are first trained in their basic specialty. Infantry is trained as infantry, artillery as artillery, engineers as engineers, etc. This training would be carried out on the battalion or, in the case of the artillery and shore party, regimental level under the direct supervision of division headquarters. The next phase of training is combined training in which the infantry and supporting arms train with each other to form teams, such as, an artillery-tank-infantry team. The first sub-phase of this training will usually be the training with the infantry battalion as the basic unit, working with units of the supporting arms. After this sub-phase of training is completed it will be necessary to conduct training under conditions which groups of more than one infantry battalion train for operations together, supported by division supporting units.

The simultaneous training of two or more groups of infantry battalions, each with supporting units from division will have to be conducted under the supervision and coordination of a headquarters below the division and above the battalion level. In the peacetime tables of organization the regimental echelon that had previously performed these functions has been eliminated, so, it will therefore be necessary that such an echelon be supplied from personnel available in division headquarters. These pro-

visional headquarters, which in this article will be called command groups, must contain the necessary officers and enlisted personnel to perform the functions of supervision and coordination that would normally be required in the training situation described. A typical training task organization for a division for such combined training is listed below:

Combat Team A	Combat Team B	Combat Team C
Command Gp A 2 Infantry Bns Provisional Arty Bn of 2 Btys Tank Co (—)	Command Gp B 2 Infantry Bns Provisional Arty Bn of 2 Btys Tank Co (—)	Command Gp C 2 Infantry Bns Provisional Arty Bn of 2 Btys Tank Bn (—)

The command group that is formed to coordinate the training of each of the combat teams should be organized in advance of the time it is to perform its duties and should be trained to function as a headquarters in all respects. Many of the functions that they would be required to carry out in the training of the combat team are listed below, together with occasional indications of the personnel who might be assigned to the command group to perform the functions for the group.

tion must be such that it can train for these operations in peacetime. The first problem that would confront a division about to conduct an amphibious operation or exercise would be embarkation. The basic organization of the landing force for embarkation is the embarkation group. The embarkation group is organized around the regimental combat team or similar

unit. Long experience has shown that a unit of this size because of its adaptability to control during embarkation is ideally suited for this task. In keeping with the principle that there must be corresponding commanders at each echelon of the naval and landing force organizations, the navy provides the transport division to correspond with the embarkation group. Likewise the embarkation group is broken down into embarkation teams for which the corresponding naval unit is the single ship. The major ship-

Function	Combat Team A	Combat Team B	Combat Team C
Command	Asst Div Comdr		Div Comdr
Chief of Staff or Executive	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	Chief of Staff
G-1	Asst G-1	Asst G-1	G-1
G-2	Asst G-2	Asst G-2	G-2
G-3	Asst G-3	Asst G-3	G-3
G-4	Asst G-4	Asst G-4	G-4
Air	Fwd Air Controller	Fwd Air. Controller	Air Officer
Artillery	CO Prov Arty Bn	CO Prov Arty Bn	Arty Officer
Signal	CO Signal Co	Exec Signal Co	Signal Officer
Supply	Asst Supply O	Asst Supply O	Supply O
Tank	CO Tank Co	CO Tank Co	Tank Officer

Each of the above officers should have with him sufficient enlisted personnel to assist him in the performance of his duties; if these personnel are not available in division headquarters they must be furnished from other sources within the body of the division.

A Marine division must be prepared to conduct amphibious operations, and its organiza-

ping that would normally be required to transport a peacetime Marine division, reinforced with normal supporting units, would be nine APAs, three AKAs, and two LSDs. This shipping would constitute a transport squadron which would normally be organized into three transport divisions. An embarkation task organization for that portion of a division that would

normally embark in such a transport squadron for an amphibious operation or exercise might therefore be as follows:

Embarkation Group A	Embarkation Group B	Embarkation Group C
Command Group A 2 Infantry Bns Shore Party Group Engineer Co Coll and Clear Co 105mm How Bty Mil Police Plat Recon Platoon Tank Co (—) (in LSD)	Command Group B 2 Infantry Bns Shore Party Group Engineer Co Coll and Clear Co 105mm How Bty Mil Police Plat Recon Platoon Tank Co (—) (in LSD)	Command Group C 2 Infantry Bns Div Shore Party (—) Engineer Bn (—) Medical Bn (—) 105mm How Bty Mil Police Co (—) Recon Co (—)

The remainder of the division would normally be embarked in landing ships.

The command groups for each of the embarkation groups must be capable of performing certain functions. These functions are listed below, together with the personnel available or who might be assigned by the division commander to perform the functions. The enlisted personnel required are not listed but must be furnished in appropriate numbers, either from division headquarters or other sources to assist the staff in performance of their duties.

Enlisted personnel required in the staff sections will have to be assigned from division headquarters, subordinate units of the division, or outside sources. The necessary communication personnel for the command group will have to be assigned from the signal company augmented as necessary from subordinate elements of the division or from outside sources. It will be necessary for the staff officers and their assistants to be trained thoroughly in the functions that they are to perform. In the assignment of personnel

for embarkation it must be kept in mind that many of these personnel will also be involved at the time of embarkation in other functions, so

great care must be exercised to assign personnel whose normal duties will not interfere at any time with their assigned functions during embarkation and the debarkation to follow.

THE NEXT PHASE of an amphibious operation that presents a problem to the division headquarters is the debarkation and ship-to-shore movement. In the ship-to-shore movement experience has shown that for ease of control, flexibility of execution, and because of the normal requirements of the tactical situation; an echelon of command between the division and the landing team level must be established. This is the combat team echelon which must function not only during the ship-to-shore movement but also during operations ashore until such time as division can establish itself ashore. The application of a division headquarters to the ship-to-shore movement will be dealt with in the same manner as was employed in discussing problems of embarkation. The functions required will be listed and a possible solution presented, apply-

Function	Embark Gp A	Embark Gp B	Embark Gp C
Command	Asst Div Comdr	None specifically provided. Div Inspector, Inf Bn CO, or other might be assigned	Div Comdr
Chief of Staff or Executive	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	Chief of Staff
G-1	Asst G-1	Asst G-1	G-1
G-4	Asst G-4	Asst G-4	G-4
Adjutant	Asst Adjutant	Asst Adjutant	Adjutant
Provost Marshal	CO MP Plat	CO MP Plat	Div Provost Marshal
Signal	CO Signal Co	Exec Sig Co	Div Sig O
Supply	Asst Sup O	Asst Sup O	Div Sup O
Tank	Liaison O from Tank Bn	Liaison O from Tank Bn	Tank Officer
Medical	Asst Medical O	CO Coll and Clear Co	Div Med O
Ordnance	Asst Ordn O	None specifically provided	Div Ordnance Officer
Transport Quartermaster	Asst TQM	None specifically provided. Chemical O, Food Director or other might be assigned.	Div TQM

ing the means available in division headquarters to the required functions.

The task grouping that will be used in this example of the ship-to-shore movement is: (1) two combat teams, each consisting of: two infantry battalions, a military police platoon, a reconnaissance platoon, a collecting and clearing company, and an engineer company; (2) an artillery group; (3) a tank group; and (4) the remainder of the division.

It will be noted, that in this task organization only the organic elements of the division have been listed. It is realized that for an amphibious exercise or operation it would be necessary to reinforce the division with Service Command elements and other supporting units, however,

for purposes of this article, only the organic elements of the division are being considered. Likewise, for purposes of simplicity, no provision has been made for a rear echelon of the division.

In each command group for the combat teams, there must be included from division headquarters the necessary personnel to perform the functions required of the headquarters. These must not only include staff officers and their officer and enlisted assistants but must include the necessary communication and service personnel that will permit each command group to function as a normal headquarters.

The more important functions that will have to be performed by division headquarters and each command group during the execution of

Function	Command Gp A	Command Gp B	Command Gp C
Command	Asst Div Comdr	None specifically provided. Div Inspector, Inf Bn Comdr, or other might be assigned	Div Comdr
Chief of Staff or Executive	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	Chief of Staff
G-1	Asst G-1	Asst G-1	G-1
G-2	Asst G-2	Asst G-2	G-2
G-3	Asst G-3	Asst G-3	G-3
G-4	Asst G-4	Asst G-4	G-4
Adjutant	Asst Adjutant	Asst Adjutant	Adjutant
Air	Fwd Air Controller	Fwd Air Controller	Div Air O
Artillery	Liaison O from Arty Regt	Liaison O from Arty Regt	Div Arty O
Chaplain	Asst Chaplain	None specifically provided. H & S Bn Chap or other might be assigned	Div Chaplain
Dental	Asst Dental O	None specifically provided	Div Dental O
Engineer	CO Engr Co	CO Engr Co	Div Engr
Chemical	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	Div Chem O unless assigned as TQM CT-B
Headquarters Commandant	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	Div Hq Comdt
Liaison	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	None specifically provided
Civil Affairs	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	None specifically provided
Motor Transport	CO MT Plat, Serv Co might be assigned	None specifically provided	Div MT O
Naval Gunfire	NGF Liaison O	NGF Liaison O	Div NGF O
Ordnance	Asst Ordn O	None specifically provided	Div Ordn O
Provost Marshal	CO MP Plat	CO MP Plat	Div Provost Marshal
Public Info	Combat Correspondent	Combat Correspondent	Div Public Info Officer
Shore Party	CO Shore Party Group	CO Shore Party Group	CO Div Shore Party
Signal	CO Signal Co	Exec Sig Co	Div Signal O
Supply	Asst Supply O	Asst Supply O	Div Supply O
Medical	Asst Medical O	CO Coll and Clearing Co	Div Medical O
Tank	Liaison O from Tank Bn	Liaison O from Tank Bn	Div Tank O
Transport Quartermaster	Asst TQM	None specifically provided. Chemical O or other might be assigned	Div TQM
Logistical Representative on Control Vessel	None specifically provided. Food Director or other might be assigned	None specifically provided	Asst G-4
Tactical Representative on Control Vessel	None specifically provided	None specifically provided	Asst G-3 (Liaison)

the ship-to-shore movement have been tabulated on the preceding page together with the personnel that are available for assignment to perform the function. In this situation, as in those previously discussed, the commander must make the decision on the assignment of personnel according to the situation and the requirements levied upon division headquarters and the combat teams.

It is apparent from the above and the tables on pages 38 and 39 that the division headquarters will be taxed to the utmost to provide personnel to perform the functions required in the ship-to-shore movement. The division headquarters must operate as a division headquarters, it must furnish the necessary personnel for two combat team headquarters, and in addition to performing its own duties as a division headquarters must act as the headquarters for the third combat team. This situation will perhaps present the greatest organizational problem that will confront a division commander in organizing his headquarters for possible operations. Some of the details of this problem will now be discussed.

Comparing the number of personnel that are available in the division headquarters as diagrammed with the personnel who have been listed in the above assignment shows that the great majority of the personnel of the headquarters have been utilized. The personnel who have not been used are: four officers in the Disbursing Section, four officers in the Inspector Section, and three officers in the Special Services Section, a total of eleven officers. The officers in division headquarters who have not been listed, such as the air observers and language officers, and who would be performing their primary duties have not been considered since they undoubtedly would not be available for any other duties in the headquarters. The number of places in the above tabulation where "none specifically provided" is shown and no assignment indicated is eighteen, which means that if every officer in division headquarters were used, without reference to his qualifications, there would still be a shortage of seven individuals. It should also be noted that for the functions that have been listed there has only been one officer assigned to perform the function. In order to provide the additional officers to perform the functions listed and to increase the number of officers available to provide assistance for those assigned, it will be necessary that additional officers be provided from sources outside the division headquarters. The subordinate elements of

the division, mainly the infantry, are, of course, one source of such personnel. The undesirable connotations in such a solution are manifest, however, since these units will be utilizing their officers to perform the tasks that they themselves have been assigned.

If additional officers are not available from sources outside the division, it is possible that, with careful planning, training, and supervision, certain officers available in the division might be assigned two functions to perform. An example of this is the adjutant of one of the combat teams; if no one were available to perform the function of headquarters commandant for the combat team he might be assigned that duty in addition to his duties of adjutant. Also, this procedure might have to be resorted to during the displacement of a command post from ship-to-shore, since this displacement normally requires two echelons just as it does in a land displacement. Another possible solution to this problem of shortage of personnel might be found in the fact that for certain phases one person could perform two functions; an example of this is the TQM who might also act as the logistical representative on the control vessel; or in displacing a command post ashore that the "2" and "3" sections be combined under one officer. None of the above solutions is desirable, but some such arrangement must be contrived. Early in the period of training of a division, the division commander must make the decision as to how he will solve this problem and, by careful analysis of the situation, make the decision as to how his headquarters will operate and then train his headquarters to operate in accordance with his decision.

Thus far only the situation as it pertains to officer personnel has been considered. The same problems are present relative to enlisted personnel. In assigning them to assist in the functioning of the headquarters the same procedures outline above for the staff officers will have to be put into effect.

In other types of operations whenever the division is subdivided into one or more combat teams requiring division headquarters to furnish command groups, there will be a similar shortage of personnel as in the case of the ship-to-shore movement. To counter this shortage of personnel, a division commander must make a thorough study of all of the situations that might confront his division and so organize his headquarters that it will be able to perform its func-

The Peacetime Marine Brigade

THE MARINE BRIGADE is organized with subordinate units similar to those in the division. All of the arms and services represented in the division are also represented in the brigade. The brigade has a strength of 5,308 Marine Corps and Navy personnel distributed throughout eight battalions.

The brigade headquarters and service battalion includes a headquarters company which provides the personnel of brigade and battalion headquarters; a service company which provides the service and supply personnel and the motor transport for the battalion, as well as the post exchange personnel for the entire brigade; and a signal company which provides the communication personnel for brigade headquarters. The battalion commander is the Brigade Headquarters Commandant, the service company commander is the Brigade Motor Transport Officer, and the platoon leader of the post exchange platoon in the service company is the Brigade Post Exchange Officer.

The special troops battalion is made up of five companies: (1) A headquarters and service company containing the battalion's administrative and service personnel; (2) An engineer company; (3) An amphibian truck company equipped with 23 DUKWs; (4) An amphibian tractor company of five LVT(A)s and 50 LVTs and (5) A tank company with three flame thrower tanks and 17 regular tanks. The engineer company commander is the Brigade Engineer and the tank company commander is the Brigade Tank Officer.

The brigade medical battalion is a three company organization, including a headquarters and service company, a hospital company, and a collecting and clearing company.

The shore party battalion has a headquarters and service company, a shore stevedore company with no authorized personnel, and three shore party companies. Each of the shore party companies has the basic personnel required for a shore party team. As in the case of the division shore party the brigade shore party requires augmentation in the form of basic personnel, upon activation.

The artillery battalion has a headquarters and service battery and three six gun 105mm howitzer batteries, providing the brigade with eighteen 105mm Howitzers. The artillery battalion commander is the Brigade Artillery Officer.

The infantry element in the brigade comprises three infantry battalions, organized similarly to those in the division.


US MC

tions under the various circumstances which it may logically be expected to operate. He cannot depend on getting additional personnel from sources outside the division and therefore must utilize the personnel who are available to him and by careful organization, constant training, and meticulous supervision prepare his headquarters to meet all of the demands that will be made upon it.

The peacetime Marine Brigade headquarters is similar to that of the division in that all of the staff sections that are represented in the division headquarters with the exception of the Assistant Division Commander Section are represented in the brigade headquarters. The staff sections have fewer personnel than those in the division, however all of the elements in each staff section are represented. The application of the headquarters of the brigade to operations that might confront it is not quite the same as in the case of division headquarters, since a situation cannot be visualized wherein the brigade headquarters would have to furnish a command group for a subordinate task unit that it might organize.

A HEADQUARTERS is defined as a group of officers and enlisted men forming the directing and coordinating head of a tactical or administrative unit, usually including the unit commander, his staff, and attached personnel, which performs duties in relation to administration, intelligence, operations, communications, and other necessary activities. The tables of organization prescribe the personnel who are available to form a headquarters. It is the duty of the commander to so organize his headquarters that it will be able to perform the functions of a headquarters on any missions that might be assigned the unit. In peacetime it is necessary that units not only train for their peacetime missions but that they train so that they will be ready for operations in time of war. The organization of the headquarters of the peacetime division and brigade are new and have not been tested in war or peace. They will require a thorough analysis and judicious application to all situations that can be envisaged and, by tests in training exercises, sound decisions made as to their precise application and detailed method of functioning.

US MC



Devil Birds

THE BATTLE FOR OKINAWA

THE MIGHTY AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION against Okinawa in the Ryukyu Retto was, in a sense, a dress rehearsal which turned out to be the last act of the protracted Pacific war.

To close the gap between Iwo Jima and Japan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that one or more islands in the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyus) be taken to provide adequate bases to intensify air operations against the Empire itself, and to cut the already harassed supply lines between Japan,

the China Coast, and the outlying remnants of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The island of Okinawa was selected as the prime target. Only 350 miles from Kyushu, its topography and land mass of almost five hundred square miles would provide excellent air bases facilities, several of which the enemy, with his usual providence, had constructed there.

Planning for the capture of Okinawa envisioned it as the largest operation of the Pacific war because of the magnitude of forces, problems, and distances involved. More than 1,200 ships of the Pacific Fleet and its supporting echelons were committed along with 450,000 troops and 10,000 aircraft. It was so planned that, in addition to the tactical value of its capture and defense, the Okinawa campaign was to serve as a giant testing laboratory for all the techniques and materiel thus far developed in the Pacific theater. The war machine, thus perfected, would be hurled against Japan itself.

The mission of its capture, development, and defense was assigned to the Joint Expeditionary Force under Adm Raymond Spruance. LtGen Simon Bolivar Buckner, USA, directed the amphibious forces ashore, which were composed of the XXIV Army Corps, the III Amphibious

By Capt John DeChant

Corps, and the Tactical Air Force (TAF). Commanding the troops of the III Corps was the most versatile triphibious veteran in the Pacific —MajGen Roy Geiger.

Marine MajGen Francis P. Mulcahy was named commanding general of the Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army, after relinquishing his post at Aircraft, FMF, Pacific, to MajGen James T. Moore. Mulcahy was also put in command of the Second Marine Air Wing which was the

TAF for the first six weeks of the Okinawa campaign.

Marine Aviation was picked to carry on the initial tactical air work ashore at Okinawa because its air groups were geared to move fast and operate flexibly and had extensive experience with similar campaigns in the Pacific. Its squadrons had been trained to a fine edge, in recent months, by the job of pounding the bypassed islands. The Second Marine Air Wing was selected because it had recently finished the Peleliu operation and its organization, as an experienced staff nucleus, was available in Hawaii.

When planning for Okinawa got underway in December 1944, Gen Mitchell's First Wing was committed to large-scale operations in support of Army forces in the Philippines, with continuing action in the New Britain area. The widely scattered Fourth Wing under Gen Woods was polishing off its aerial strangulation work in the Central Pacific and the Third Marine Air Wing at Ewa, Oahu, was serving as a training and replacement unit.

The TAF was activated at Schofield Army Barracks, Oahu, T.H., in December 1944, and occupied staff quarters there in the compound of the Tenth Army Headquarters. Staff operations

Part IX: Second Marine Air Wing and TAF set up at Yontan Airfield after landing. Jap air opposition was in the last stages of being strangled, but the enemy came up with two new slants: suicidal Kamikaze and commando-like Giretsu

of the Second Marine Air Wing continued at nearby Ewa Air Station.

To meet the complex demands of the role which the TAF would play in the combined operation, Gen Mulcahy peopled both the staff of TAF and the Second Wing with long-time veterans of tactical air warfare in the Pacific. BrigGen William A. Wallace, veteran of the Solomons, took over the Air Defense Command. Army Col Bernard A. Bridget who had served ably on the Joint air staff at Peleliu became Chief of Staff, TAF. The legendary Col Hayne D. Boyden was named second in command of the Air Wing. Hardest Navy veteran was the chief medical officer, LtComdr Tom Flaherty, MC, USN, who had pioneered air evacuation at Guadalcanal and who was to die in a plane crash soon after the Okinawa landing.

Air units participating were assigned early in the planning stages by Marine AirFMFPac: Navy's COMAIRPAC and AAF, Pacific Ocean Areas. The majority of Marine air elements involved were released from other operating Wings in the Pacific. Units of MAGs 31, 33, and later 22 were detached from the Fourth Wing. MAG 14 joined from the First Wing in the Philippines.

Most of the squadrons slated for the target had seen combat of sorts which consisted, in the main, of milk-run bombing or combat air patrol during which the enemy air force was seldom if ever encountered. Many of the pilots were replacements with a maximum of training and a minimum of combat. The personnel rosters showed a bare handful of the pilots who had made headlines in the early phases of the Pacific war. Men like "Mad Jack" Cram and the fighter ace Ken Walsh arrived too late in the Okinawa campaign to add much to their past records.

The TAF planned nothing radically new for Okinawa, although there were many modifications and minor innovations in strategy and weapons. The most notable of these improvements were: Better integration of air and ground offensive units; more efficient radar gear; better-trained night-fighter pilots; and a wider latitude of emphasis and responsibility for the air-warning squadrons.

As conceived in the planning stages, the TAF missions at Okinawa were, primarily:

- (1) To establish headquarters and tactical units ashore as soon as practicable after "L Day."
- (2) To execute the air support mission assigned by the Commander, Joint Expeditionary

Force, as long as he functioned as such in the area.

(3) Thereafter, to provide for air defense and air support for the ground and supporting surface forces in the Okinawa area by application of available air power as dictated by the overall situation and as directed by higher authority.

Initial mounting stages for TAF began February 22, 1945, when 46 officers and 102 enlisted men sailed from Pearl Harbor for San Pedro Bay, Leyte, P.I., where their ship arrived in convoy March 16 to join the gathering might of the XXIV Army Corps or Southern Attack Force.

Ground personnel of Col John C. Munn's MAG 31 units went aboard AKAs and LSTs at Roi-Namur with the ground crews of VMF's 224, 311, and 411. Two escort carriers loaded the squadrons' pilots and planes along with the flight personnel of VMF (N) 542.

Col Ward E. Dickey's MAG 33 embarked on an APA and LSTs at Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides. His first echelons flew their Corsairs to Manus Island where two CVEs embarked the planes and flight personnel of VMF's 312, 322, 323, and VMF (N) 543, which had previously loaded. The two flight echelon convoys arrived at Ulithi for the final staging March 30. Ground echelons were routed to the target via Saipan.

• "L DAY" FOR OKINAWA was set for Easter Sunday morning, April 1, 1945. For months prior to the invasion date, elements of the Third and Fifth Fleets, including the Marine fighter squadrons, had been hammering at installations, harbors, and air fields in the Ryukyus, Formosa, Kyushu, China, and the satellite islands in the target area in a mounting, softening-up effort. The Navy had been well assisted in its strategic bombing and raiding by units of the British Pacific Fleet and the Army Air Force bomber commands.

The bulk of the preliminary Allied efforts was concentrated on neutralizing enemy air installations within striking range of Okinawa. As "L Day" approached, the entire weight of Allied air strength in the Western Pacific was directed against enemy airfields which lay roughly within the quadrilateral of Kyushu, China, Formosa, and the Ryukyus. The mounting toll of damage to enemy planes, ground installations, and normal existence was heavy, but not sufficient for wholesale destruction or even continued neutralization. The enemy, from this network of air bases, was able to maintain a considerable num-


ber of attack planes over Okinawa during the invasion phases and all too consistently thereafter.

As the assault armada converged on the target in the final hours of March, the invasion forces were convinced that the landing in the Ryukyus would be the traditional "This is it" with a vengeance. They expected the bitterest of resistance from all quarters. And they got it, but with variations on the theme as they had known it.

In a startling silence after the preliminary bombardment, the assault waves went ashore standing up, on that sunlit, almost pastoral Easter Sunday morning. They moved inland quickly over Okinawa's southwestern central beaches through that same ominous, unbelievable silence. Two major objectives — Yontan airfield to the north and Kadena field about one mile to the south of it — were easily secured on "L Day."

The first American planes to land on Okinawa were the observation planes of VMO-3. On April 2, two yellow Grasshoppers landed at Yontan from escort carriers offshore. The remainder of VMO-3 augmented by three pilots of VMO-2 landed soon after. The unit's full-scale operations began on April 4. Organized as spotters for four artillery battalions, Capt Wallace J. Slaphey's squadron, by April 11, was serving eleven Army and Marine artillery units.

LANDING CASUALTIES were nominal for all units of TAF and Gen Mulcahy and his staff went ashore April 2 to establish TAF and Second Wing Headquarters at a site less than a mile southeast of Yontan field. When the first-phase traffic bottleneck broke, heavy equipment and supplies poured ashore. By April 7, the engineers and seabees had punched through the



debris and leveled off enough of Yontan's runway to permit fighter operations.

Hovering off-shore 100 miles east of Okinawa were the carrier-borne Corsairs of MAG 31. Led by the affable veteran Munn, the gull-winged F4U-IDs were catapulted off during a Kamikaze attack on the carriers. A lone Jap bomber had wiggled through the defensive screen of carrier-based fighters. He came in low over the water on the CVE group, then busy launching its fighters. Eight planes of VMF 311 on combat air patrol, splashed the bomber a few hundred feet off one of the CVE's. This single kill on the way to battle was a significant introduction to the enemy suicide tactics which played a dominant role in the air battle of Okinawa.

These Jap suicide missions concentrated on three objectives: elimination of the radar picket craft serving as the outlying screen; destruction

of the combat naval forces covering the operation; and destruction of the troop transports, cargo ships, and other elements of the supporting amphibious forces supplying the impetus to the campaign.

Elements of the enemy air force in the Okinawa battle were not all members of the Kamikaze Corps, but the latter were sufficient in number and successful enough to do major damage to the naval forces. Thirty ships of the supporting forces were sunk and 223 damaged. The corresponding loss of life was equally startling, but on both sides. Except for overwhelming American air superiority and the accuracy of the gunners in the Fleet, the final effect of the Kamikaze effort might well have been appalling, even to the point of defeating the Okinawa venture.

After splashing the bomber near the carriers, planes of VMF 311 (Hell's Belles), VMF 441 (Black Jacks), VMF 224 (Fighting Wild Cats), and VMF (N) 542 landed at Yontan on April 7. Two days later, elements of MAG 33 pancaked at Kadena field. Col Dickey's command on the first day of operation included VMF 312 (Day's Knights), VMF 322 (Fighting Cocks), VMF 323 (Death Rattlers), and VMF (N) 543 (Night Hawks).

THE TWO AIR GROUPS mounted patrols their first day ashore even though the enemy and the elements seemed to have conspired to make operations impossible for the TAF.

The usual hard work required in this critical period was hamstrung by a combination of incessant Jap bombing and strafing, enemy artillery fire, a cascade of our own AA shell fragments, heavy rains and foul weather, all of which slowed construction work on the fields and made air operations hazardous.

The combat-hungry Marine pilots took their first good bite out of the Japanese air force on April 12. After an all-night Jap bombing Kadena planes scrambled to meet an incoming morning raid and downed two Tony's and a Judy. In the early afternoon, VMF 312 pilots Johnson, Revnes, Webb, and Holden, took on 20 Zeroes and four single-engine bombers at 18,000 feet over the Motobu Peninsula.

The enemy formation broke up on contact and the ensuing dogfight ranged over a forty-mile area from 18,000 feet to sea level. Forty-five minutes later, the score was 8 to 0. Though it was their first time in combat, Johnson got three, Revnes two, and Webb and Holden one each.

Landing while the field was under a heavy artillery barrage, they reported that the Zeros' evasive tactics were poor and that four Jap pilots had bailed out during the battle. One hour later, another large Marine formation shot down three Zeke fighters and a Betty bomber for the day's total of 15.

BEGINNING on April 13, the Corsair squadrons which were doubling in brass as fighter and fighter-bomber units, flew their first of the long series of air-support missions in the campaign. Thirty-six Corsairs, each loaded with two 550-pound bombs and eight 5-inch rockets, worked over enemy artillery positions four miles behind Japanese lines. The results were highly satisfactory, according to ground observers. Pilots reported hits on 18 gun emplacements concealed in caves.

It was a good beginning. Weather permitting, and many times when it didn't, the Corsairs flew strike after strike in direct support of both Marine and Army infantry throughout the long campaign, but the major fighter activity during the first weeks at Okinawa was a continual aerial turkey shoot.

Another killing came April 16, when, after enduring a hectic night of bombing and shelling, the F4U pilots bagged 36 planes. The dawn CAP and early morning patrols downed 18½ planes. Shortly before noon, the climax of the day's action came when four divisions from VMF 441 attacked a mixed flight of 25 Japanese planes, destroying 15½.

A bizarre and profitable period for the TAF began in the early evening of April 22 when a seven-plane patrol of the Death Rattler squadron ran amok over the East China Sea. Intercepting 39 enemy planes about forty miles north of Aguni Shima, the Marines downed 25 of them in as many minutes. In the action, three pilots who had never scored previously emerged as aces.

Twenty-one year old Lt Jerry O'Keefe, destined to be the top Okinawa-made ace, squinted in on five bombers and dropped them all. Only one gave him a bad time. The Jap plane burst into flames and, instead of going down, turned head-on into O'Keefe. He pushed the gun pipper down and sweated. When they were less than fifty feet apart, the Jap Val shuddered, rolled off and exploded on the ocean.

By all scoreboard counts, the belle of that evening battle was Maj Jefferson Davis Dorroh, the squadron's executive officer. He ran his

score from zero to six in twenty minutes of squirrel-cage fighting. Dorroh burned five and exploded his sixth.

It was a rare day for Maj George C. Axtell, Jr. who had shot down five Japs in fifteen minutes. The intense, gangling, "Big Axe," at the tender age of 24 years, was probably the youngest regular Marine fighter skipper of the war. If that honor was not his, certainly the record of his squadron was. His "deadly passel of kids" as one elderly veteran of 28 tagged them, played havoc with the Japanese air force and percentages. In less than two months of operation, the Death Rattlers topped all existing Marine air records by shooting down 124½ enemy planes without a single loss of their own in aerial combat.

Axtell readily admitted that, by critical comparison, their lopsided score was easier to come by than those records earned earlier in the war against the cream of the enemy's fighter pilots. As Sol Mayer, the unit's scrounging mess officer purportedly pointed out over his pork chops,

"... A few minutes later, I saw the next Jap turn on his lights and come down the runway. I looked for him to start flaming, but he went past the tower. The engines were cut and he came in noiselessly for a perfect belly landing 100 yards away . . ."

"They had it good in the Solomons, but they didn't have Kamikazes!"

Combat analysts who studied the Okinawa air campaign in contrast with its predecessors agreed, by inference, that there was considerable sagacity in Sol Mayer's statement.

Japan's startlingly high proportion of losses in aerial combat did not properly mirror the expertness of the enemy's air tactics nor the considerable success of his mission at Okinawa. In spite of overwhelming American air superiority and the number of Japanese planes shot down, many of the Kamikaze Corps died, doing damage all out of proportion to their individual losses. Thousands of American seamen died aboard destroyers, destroyer escorts, picket boats, transports, LST's and LCT's, and the larger ships of the Fleet from these suicide attacks. Thousands more were wounded and the materiel damage was major.

The primary mission of the enemy fighter planes was not to dogfight for supremacy of the air. The queer variety of protecting Jap fighters tried only to herd the suicide bombers through the fighter craft of TAF as best they could. These motley Jap planes assortments often looked to

Marine pilots as though the Smithsonian Institute had suddenly taken to wing.

The losses to American shipping would certainly have been appallingly higher, according to those at sea, had it not been for the marksmanship, tenacity, and courage of the fighter pilots. Message after message from the harassed Navy congratulating TAF pilots and squadrons bumped their way down the chain of command to Gen Mulcahy's sandbagged headquarters in acknowledgment of the Marine efforts on behalf of the Fleet.

• TAF PILOTS found another "gold mine in the sky" on April 28, when 35½ more Japanese planes were shot down. Then the fitful air war lapsed into another breathing spell, marked by foul weather, Jap night raids, and the shelling of Pistol Pete.

With the infantry, it was a different story. In an attempt to break the stalemate along the southern front, Tenth Army troops launched a strong attack May 2 against the heavily fortified


Japanese positions. Weather denied air support to the offensive, and only small gains were made.

During the period from May 3 to 5, the enemy launched a strong counteroffensive supported by sea and air forces. Several heavy attacks were hurled against Buckner's main positions on the southern front and Japanese raiding parties landed small units behind Tenth Army lines on both coasts. The main Japanese attacks and infiltrations were broken up with the enemy infantry losing an estimated 4,000 men.

The enemy air counterattack reached its peak the morning of May 4. Rather than saturation of TAF's air defense by single mass attacks, the Japanese used infiltration by small groups attacking from all over the compass.

The Japanese turned their hangars inside out for the occasion. Marines reported shooting down at least 12 known types of enemy bombers and fighters during the day. In return, Marines provided their own brand of variety. Thirty-three pilots were credited with victories on May 4, for a total of 60 kills.

Again the Death Rattlers took scoring honors with 24¾ planes for a squadron total of 80½ planes. The unit's ace roster rose to seven as



Yontan Airfield looking northeast towards East China Sea. Single Giretsu attack netted Japs 29 planes destroyed, 70,000 barrels of gasoline, 20 Marine casualties.

three more pilots—Lts Rusham, Wade, and Dillard—shot down four apiece.

VMF 311, second ranking squadron of the TAF, added 17 more Jap planes to the day's total. On a dusk patrol intercept west of Naha, four of its planes scratched 11 Jap Tonys and Dinahs. Before the last of the enemy planes were disposed of, Lt William Brown, who had gotten four of them, reported that the Corsairs were firing at silhouettes in the evening sky.

Not one TAF plane was lost during the day's fighting which raised the Second Wing's score to 205 planes shot down in less than a month of action. But the month of May was not without its rigors. The suicide rat-races at masthead level had hardened the fighter pilots to riding the Kamikazes down through the clawing blanket of ship-based flak regardless of the danger. A lieutenant named Richard O. Hansen, on May 7, splashed a Tony on a suicide run 50 feet off the port bow of a destroyer. To make his kill, he was forced to fly through a barrage of AA fire spewed up by the guns of five friendly LCIs and two destroyers.

Veterans of antisubmarine patrols and milk run raids from Ulithi, the pilots of VMTB 232 arrived at Okinawa in late April. Flying TBM-3s the General Motors' version of the Avenger, the squadron established itself as the workhorse of the TAF.

During May, VMTB 232 flew 50 strikes in support of the ground troops, 50 night harassing sorties, 151 combat observation missions, 125 antisubmarine patrols, 74 air-drop missions, and a candy-counter assortment of flights which included spraying DDT, aerial photography, message and propaganda leaflet drops, and hunting radar stations. It encountered enemy AA on 240 of these low-level missions.

Supply drops by VMTB 232 and VMTB 131, which arrived later in the campaign, were a major contribution to air-infantry support at Okinawa. During a 12-day period, Feldmaier's unit racked off 327 supply sorties for troops of the III Corps. All types of infantry ammunition, water, rations, batteries, 28 miles of wire, and a telephone switchboard were included in nearly 200,000 pounds dropped by the TBMs. In June the two squadrons made 485 extremely accurate drops to Army and Marine front line units when Okinawa's weather quagmired the infantry's normal supply routes.

During its entire supply drop operation, the Second Air Wing parachuted more than 600,000 pounds of food, ammunition, and medical supplies to the infantry on 760 sorties. Ninety-eight per cent of the supplies was actually recovered by the ground troops.

Middleman between the infantry and the airmen on these air supply missions was the Air

Delivery Section of the III Corps. This small unit, commanded by Lt Richard Sinclair, a former paramarine, had served on nine previous combat operations in the Solomons, New Britain, and the Marianas.

THE TAF, showing serious signs of wear and strain after five intensive weeks of operation, was bolstered May 14 by three P-47 squadrons of the AAF's 318th Fighter Group. Two days earlier, the first elements of MAG 22, under Col Daniel Torrey, had arrived at Ie Shima after a 2,500 mile flight from the Central Pacific.*

SHAPED LIKE A FAT PEANUT, Ie Shima, five miles long and half that in width, was the American-held island air base closest to the mainland of Japan. It was three and one-half miles off the tip of Motobu Peninsula, 25 miles northwest of Yontan field. Under constant fire from Jap bombers and enemy raiding parties, Ie Shima was an outpost in the shadow-war waged by the Marine air warning and night fighter squadrons.

Night-fighter operations were integrated with TAF's Air Defense Control Center. Its radar spotter stations served as the outer warning screen for Okinawa. The radar network which plotted incoming enemy planes day and night began initial operations aboard ship. The first AWS station went ashore at Zamami Shima in the Ryukyus March 29 and the station at Naganu Shima was in operation two days later. This network expanded rapidly until it numbered 28 stations in two months. These, including six Ground Intercept stations for night-fighter control, were strategically located on Okinawa and five outlying islands.

Night kills in the first five weeks showed a thin total of ten, although enemy bombers were over Okinawa night after night. Perfected operations between the expanding AWS net and squadrons VMF (N) 542 and 543 were badly hampered by constant trouble with the delicate electronic gear, lack of adequate sites for the radar screens, poor field operating conditions with bulldozers and enemy bombs defying the planes to take-off or land intact, costly interference from the understandably trigger-happy AA gunners of the Fleet, and the mine-run troubles of early-phase campaigning.

Then up from Eniwetok in the Marshalls on May 13 came the 15 Hellcat planes of LtCol

*Ninety-three planes of squadrons VMF 113, 422, 314, and VMF (N) 533 flew the hazardous over-water trip from their bases in the Marshalls shepherded by TAG's R5C Commandos.

Marion (Black Mac) Magruder's VMF (N) 533.

Five days later the balky night-fighter operation at Okinawa had jelled and the "Crystal Gazers" and their "Night Chicks" began their own series of eerie turkey shoots.*

Under a bright three-quarter moon the night of May 18, two pilots of Magruder's squadron made five radar night kills between them in less than two hours.

RADIO TOKYO which had once preened about "control of the air over Okinawa" was now muttering dire threats of a new suicide wrinkle—the Giretsu.

Past ten-thirty the night of May 24, that new Special Attack Corps of airborne suicide troops arrived. A Sally bomber laden with human bombs crash-landed on Yontan, in what was termed "the most audacious and destructive attack on aviation installations in the campaign."

With the turning of the enemy Shuri line by the infantry, the land campaign had gone into its last phases. Artists at delaying the inevitable, the Japs withdrew to a final defense line on the southern tip of Okinawa, asking their air force for diversionary attacks. These came in sustained fury over a five-day period, touched off by the spectacular Giretsu raid on May 24.

That night there was a break in the bad weather which had turned the battlefields into red rivers of mud. The Japanese took quick advantage of the moonlight and clear skies. In a spider-web of searchlights, two bombers plastered the area around Yontan and moved on. The red alert continued. Sgt Leroy Halle on duty in the Yontan field tower reported:

"At 10:25 as ack-ack broke out to the northeast, we ducked behind the sandbags. Tracers were cutting right over our heads. This bomber was coming in at tree-top level. It burst into flames 500 yards away. Ack-ack caught it again and it exploded 30 feet off the ground. I didn't know the bomber was carrying a suicide squad until daylight when I saw a roasted Jap and pieces of several others in the wreckage."

"A few minutes later, I saw the next Jap turn in the lights and come down the runway. I looked for him to start flaming, but he went past the tower. The engines were cut and he came in noiselessly for a perfect belly landing about a hundred yards away."

While he watched, Halle saw two, then five or

*"Crystal Gazers" and "Night Chicks" were terms in the strange language that was part of night air combat. The "Gazer" was the fighter director, who guided the airborne "Chick" or pilot into a close-up position for the kill.

six more figures crouch by the side of the Jap plane. He shouted a warning and men in nearby dugouts and fox holes grabbed rifles and took up positions along the runway. The Japs fanned out towards planes parked nearby, their progress garishly lighted by moonlight and flames. Giretsu incendiary bombs burned three Commando transports as a full-scale fire-fight broke out around the crashed Sally. Then the Giretsu wriggled away from their plane, firing as they went.

Two other Jap planes loaded with raiders swung in over the runway, but were shot down in flames before they could land. The Giretsu on the field died one by one.

At daylight, Sgt Halle saw six or eight men peering at a dead Jap when the last of the Giretsu leapt from the ruins of a transport and threw a grenade into the crowd. With rifle bullets thudding into him, the Jap held a grenade to his belly and blew himself five feet in the air.

The suicide raid had been of some value to the enemy. With a loss of four transports and 69 men in the actual attack, the Jap suicide party had wrecked 29 planes and destroyed 70,000 barrels of gasoline. Two marines were killed and 18 wounded. The raid also had a temporary morale effect on the American forces, which was lost when the Japanese failed to follow with similar attacks.

Night fighters had taken some of the sting out of the night attack. Lts Trammel and Smurr (of 533) were directed to simultaneous kills by radar operator Lt Gallarneau that night. A pilot named Davis of 543 shot down two Bettys. A. F. Dellamano, a lieutenant of Magruder's squadron, made three radar kills during the melee at Yontan. His last victim was a Sally bomber, believed loaded with more Giretsu, which exploded when it crashed.

Magruder's pilots continued to swing their scythes at the moon and in seven weeks they downed 35 Jap planes to lead all Marine night-fighter squadrons. In spite of the hazards of night flying, only one of their pilots was lost in combat.

THE THREE Hellcat-flying Marine night squadrons piled up a total of 68 kills in the Okinawa campaign with VMF (N) 542 adding 18 and VMF (N) 543, 15 enemy planes to those of Magruder's unit. A less spectacular but effective phase of their operations were the night-heckling raids. Throughout their stay in Okinawa, the night-fighter squadrons raked targets behind

enemy lines on Okinawa with bomb, rocket, and machine gun fire, and haunted northern Ryukyus installations with clock-like precision.

After the Giretsu episode, the day squadrons rode hard through bad weather and leaden skies on May 25 to turn in their best day of the Okinawa campaign. With the help of two AAF squadrons, TAF Corsairs shot down 75 planes. The Army P-47s, which had made their first kill of the campaign over Kyushu the day previously, were credited with 34 victories.

The Japanese air effort on the 25th was the high point of their attempt to divert attention from their troop withdrawals on southern Okinawa. Heavy attacks on shipping were made by what amounted to the cream of the Japanese air force. Some of the newer and faster planes which appeared were not the Kamikaze type. But the Corsair and Thunderbolt pilots made no distinction and Tojos, Tonys, Hamps, Zekes, Oscars, Irvings, Jills, Nates, Bettys, and Vals all flamed or crashed with equal facility as did one unidentified survivor of the Nazi Luftwaffe, which had black swastikas painted on its wings.

Pilots of the Death Rattler squadron made eight kills on the 25th, raising their unit total to 105½ planes in six weeks. This broke the previous record for a similar period set by VMF 215 over Rabaul.

OKINAWA WEATHER, by now as infamous in curse and song as that of the Solomons, interfered with TAF action for two days but the Japanese came down on May 28 and lost 37 planes.

As the infantry campaign on Okinawa moved into its final weeks, the air war slumped. Except for two good scoring days on June 3 and 22, the well-mauled Japanese air force offered little further opposition. Its heavy losses to the TAF and the effects of fighter sweeps and bombing raids on enemy homeland air bases by the TAF, the Fifth Fleet and the B-29s finally cracked its offensive power. Except for sporadic raids, the remaining Japanese planes were carefully saved for the anticipated invasion of their Empire.

Command of TAF changed June 11 when MajGen Louis E. Woods of the Fourth Wing replaced Gen Mulcahy as head of the Tenth Army's Tactical Air Force.

June 22, the last big day in the air battle for Okinawa was, oddly enough, the day after organized enemy resistance on Okinawa was declared at an end by Gen Geiger, then command-

ing the Tenth Army.*

The aerial fracas of June 22 was marked by several headline incidents. Capt Robert Baird, VMF (N) 533, downed a Francis and a Betty, to become the first night fighter ace of the campaign. Capt Ken Walsh, Medal of Honor winner for his 20 kills in the Solomons, finally found another victim. He pushed his fast new F4U-4 in on a Zeke and splashed it for his 21st victim of the war.**

The Japanese pattern of combat on June 22 was unusual. The appearance of a large number of skillful, aggressive Jap pilots flying fast fighter types made the action comparable to those over Kahili and Rabaul. Though four TAF pilots and five planes were lost, 44 enemy planes went down, with Second Wing pilots getting 32 of them.

THE DEFENSIVE PHASE of the air battle for Okinawa was at an end June 30. Mainly as the result of night-fighter action in the last week, the TAF score reached 600½ kills on that date. During the three-month period (lacking one week) squadrons of the Second Marine Air Wing had accounted for 484½ planes or 81 per cent of the TAF kills at Okinawa. Twenty-one new Marine aces came out of the campaign.

The air battle for Okinawa was the second most profitable of the war for Marine aviation in the actual number of kills. At least 32 different types of identified Japanese planes were shot down by Marine pilots who maintained the startling odds of better than 120 to 1. Only four Marine pilots were known to have been killed in combat with planes of the Japanese Air Force.

WHILE AIR COMBAT was the spectacular contribution, there was another major phase of TAF action which was most gratifying to the air-ground team at Okinawa. It was the precision close air-support for the infantry.

Second Wing planes were responsible for a major portion of air-infantry actions during the furious and bloody campaign to take the 485 square miles of land that was Okinawa Shima. Carrier-based planes of the Fleet carried out close-support work during the first phases while

*Geiger succeeded Lieutenant General Simon Buckner who was killed on June 18 by enemy artillery fire. Geiger was appointed a lieutenant general on June 9 to become the highest ranking Marine aviator in the history of the Corps.

**The new Chance-Vought F4U-4 was first flown by Marines at Okinawa in early June. It was noted for its giant four-bladed propeller and its 2300 horsepower Pratt and Whitney radial engine. Prior to its arrival, TAF Corsair squadrons had been flying Chance-Vought F4U-1Ds and Goodyear FG-1s.



Powerhouse threat to ground installations, 5-inch rockets add to Corsair's deadliness.

Navy CVE squadrons ran a steady flow of infantry support strikes during the latter part of the campaign.

After April 10, the entire load of heavy tactical support traffic was handled by three Marine Landing Force Air Support Control Units. LFASCU one under Col Kenneth H. Weir, controlled aircraft in support of ground units of the III Corps, first on the northern and then on the southern front. LFASCU Two commanded by LtCol Kenneth Kerby handled all planes supporting the XXIV Army Corps on the southern front after April 8.

These LAFSCU units handled the complex maze of details and finesse necessary for large-scale coordination between Marine and Army troops and their supporting aircraft. The types of air strikes and missions they controlled fell mainly into the following categories:

(a) rocket, bombing, strafing, and Napalm attacks on enemy targets of immediate concern to the ground forces;

(b) similar attacks on enemy targets which were of secondary importance to the infantry, such as Japanese landing craft, supply dumps, troop bivouacs, and other rear area installations;

(c) observation missions;

(d) air supply drops to front-line troops.*

*Second Wing planes flew another type of mission for the ground troops in June, when the OY-1 observation squadron

Next month will conclude the Devil Birds series in the GAZETTE. In 10 installments we have presented the high spots of the Marine air war. For a more complete story, the unabridged Devil Birds is recommended. See the advertisement on page 6.

Second Wing planes flew big missions and small missions in support of the infantry. On occasion only four Corsairs went down to answer the call for help. Often there were 130 planes directed against a single target. At one time during the day of May 19, LFASCU Two was controlling 376 planes in the air at once, using them to batter seven different Okinawa targets simultaneously.

Repeatedly, TAF planes laid their loads on targets close to friendly troops, often within 100 yards. Out of more than 7,000 sorties in direct infantry support, there were only three recorded occasions in which bombs were dropped behind friendly lines. In these instances, casualties were minor.

IN THE BLOODY see-saw battle to take Sugar Loaf Hill in the south, the Marine air-liaison parties regularly directed bombings within 125 yards of the front lines without injury to the infantry, but with great damage to the enemy. Against heavily fortified positions like those at Shuri Castle, planes used 1,000 and 2,000 pound bombs effectively and without injury to friendly troops. The usual routine in these direct support missions employing fighter-bombers, dive or torpedo bombers, was a bombing run, then a rocket run, often followed by a strafing attack to rake up and riddle the debris left by the heavier explosives.

The use of rockets, usually the 5-inch type, made Second Wing planes more than ever the galloping gun platforms and flying artillery that had always been envisioned by Marine air-support experts. While trained pilots were able to drop bombs with a high degree of accuracy inside a 16-foot circle in dive or glide runs, it was

began evacuating wounded from behind the front lines. Operating off a narrow road below Naha, which was often under artillery fire, planes of VMO-7 made 271 evacuation flights between June 11 and 22, taking out wounded patients for treatment at rear area hospitals.

the use of rockets that made even deadlier aerial snipers out of them. Records revealed that the Marine air groups were getting better than 80 per cent of their bombs in the small target areas. Rocket accuracy, however, came close to 100 per cent hits on target.

As on June 14 when 64 Corsairs seared a cave-pocket ridge and ravine containing a heavy enemy concentration, front line air parties regularly used heavy Napalm attacks to denude a suspected area of all burnable matter in order to expose enemy positions.

During the whole of the campaign, Marine troops received direct air support on 562 missions which ranged in size from one to 75 planes. Planes on these support missions dropped 1800 tons of bombs, fired 15,800 rockets and dumped 680 tanks of napalm.

The XXIV Army Corps received 817 support missions during the first 70 days of the Okinawa battle. Forty-three separate attacks were executed in a single day to aid the Army troops, with one of the missions numbering 139 planes.

According to observers, not all of these Air Arm support missions were letter-perfect. Generally, however, they were of exceptional value to the infantry because they were credited with expediting the ground campaign and saving hundreds if not thousands of infantry casualties.

In his comments on air support at Okinawa, the commander of the Army's 7th Division said:

"In the main, both attack and reconnaissance missions were very successful. Ground forces attacking with close air support were materially aided in taking enemy strongpoints and suffered no casualties from front line air."

The Army's 96th Division Commander reported:

"The close air support during this operation was superior throughout."

These commendations for Second Wing Air support activity at Okinawa were strongly supported by those of the Marine infantry and the Navy commands.

The Okinawa campaign had provided the first large-scale opportunity for the highly-trained Marine personnel to demonstrate their conception of tactical aviation and ground support. The Air Arm answered the opportunity with a record of expert effectiveness, testified to equally by the Army and Marine ground teams. It was a fitting climax for two decades of intensive operations devoted to attaining this degree of excellence in tactical aviation.

to be concluded

The Marine Corps and the National Security Act

THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947—more commonly known as the Unification Bill—has already taken its place among the basic laws of the land.

In addition to those provisions of the bill concerned with national economy and foreign policy, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the new law contains provisions of interest to personnel of the armed services. Its provisions with regard to the Marine Corps are particularly significant.

This new law prescribes the basic functions of the major elements of the armed services. Such provisions in the law are, in effect, a directive from Congress to the armed services, stipulating the purpose for which the larger elements of the Nation's fighting forces are created and supported. Legislation of this nature is not altogether an innovation. Frequently in the past Congress has prescribed functions for various parts of the armed forces. But never before in our legislative history has any Congress so intelligently and deliberately set forth within one law the basic functions of the armed services. Congressional action in this respect was in harmony with the legislation's intent to eliminate unnecessary duplication within the armed forces and to prevent intraservice disputes over the performance of certain functions.

Within the armed forces each subordinate echelon deserves a clear-cut directive or order when a mission is assigned. Thus, it is consistent with sound military procedure that the armed services as a whole, charged with the protection of the nation, should receive a "directive" from Congress—the higher authority—stating clearly the functions that each major element of the services will perform in accomplishing the common mission of all the armed services.

The National Security Act of 1947 prescribes the general functions for the Navy, Naval Aviation, the Marine Corps, the Army, and the new Air Force. That portion of the Act pertaining to the Marine Corps reads as follows:

"The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land com-

By LtCol James D. Hittle

bat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious

operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: Provided, that such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war."

THE FIRST SENTENCE of the new law gives legal recognition to the Marine Corps, perpetuates its relationship to the naval service, and directs that the Marine Corps shall include combat, service, and aviation elements. This guarantees that the Marine Corps shall continue to be a balanced fighting force, possessing its organic aviation and service units.

The second sentence of the Marine Corps section of the bill is of key importance. It states: "The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval cam-

Secretary of National Defense

Responsibility for making the National Defense Program work rests upon the capable shoulders of James Forrestal, an early Joe of the unification bill. As Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal is presently concluding seven years with the Navy. This is not, however, his first hitch, for he enlisted in the Navy in 1915, emerging as a lieutenant (jg) after World War I. Immediately he went on Wall Street, a lonely Democrat in that Republican bulwark. Interested in politics, he urged other businessmen to enter the government, his own chance coming in 1940 when he was appointed Under Secretary in charge of procurement. The man, who once told an interviewer that his hobby was obscurity, became Secretary of the Navy upon the death of Frank Knox in 1944. His war record in that capacity is too well known to need repeating.

paign." Thus, the law now recognizes and directs that the maintenance of fleet marine forces is the fundamental function of the Marine Corps. Such a stipulation is wholly consistent with the concept of the Marine Corps, which, for the last quarter of a century, has pioneered and specialized in amphibious operations. It is in the concept of the fleet marine forces that the amphibious character of the Marine Corps finds its most convincing emphasis. True, the Marine Corps since its earliest days has engaged in amphibious operations. Also, the fact cannot be disputed but what the Marines, in the years following World War I, developed the amphibious knowledge which in World War II proved to be prerequisite of victory in global warfare. Yet the fundamentally amphibious nature of the Marine Corps, so apparent in fact and action, was not recognized in the basic laws governing the armed forces. Neither the National Defense Acts of 1903, 1916, nor 1920 even mentioned the Marine Corps.

Unrecognized by previous basic defense legislation, the role of the Marine Corps as an amphibious force in the application of the nation's naval power is now not only recognized in law, but the law makes it mandatory that fleet marine forces shall be a part of our armed forces. This, incidentally, is the only instance in which the National Security Act of 1947 makes any pro-

vision for the existence of an operating component of any of the armed services. Clearly, it was the intent of those who wrote the National Security Act that "fleet marine forces of combined arms," should be recognized by law and legally incorporated into the basic military structure of the country. To assure that these fleet marine forces would not deteriorate into lightly armed battalions or regiments used solely for landing parties, the law stipulates that the fleet marine forces shall be forces of combined arms (tanks, artillery, etc.) and supporting air components, thus assuring the continued existence of a Marine Corps capable of major combatant effectiveness.

Specific reference is made to the employment of fleet marine forces in the defense of advanced naval bases. Thus the defense of advanced naval bases, a special aspect of amphibious operations pioneered and developed by the Marines, is a function assigned to the Corps by law.

In an even broader sense this portion of the bill relating to the fleet marine forces contains what is probably the most important passage affecting the conduct of future wars by the armed forces of this nation. The key phrase is that referring to "the prosecution of a naval campaign." Statutory recognition of the naval campaign is of historic significance in the development of our national military thought. The concept of the naval campaign, a series of operations that are predominantly naval in character, is in its modern sense a purely American contribution to the art of war. The naval campaign is the forceful application of naval power in accordance with another American contribution to modern war, the theory of the "balanced fleet." The balanced fleet, consisting of naval surface, undersurface, naval air, and naval landing forces, is a combat entity, capable of exercising naval power in the most forceful meaning of the term as used by Mahan. It is a well coordinated team of aviation, landing units, and surface forces habitually trained to operate as an all-naval team under common doctrine and subject to unquestioned naval command.

This Congressional affirmation of the naval campaign is, in turn, a statutory recognition that naval power—with its forceful application by the balanced fleet—is still, and for the foreseeable future, shall continue to be a fundamental instrument of our national security. Such Congressional action was unquestionably based upon what some "experts" are altogether too prone to

overlook: that we are still a maritime nation, bounded largely by the seas; and that our national security is, in the final analysis, dependent upon control of the seas.

The Pacific War demonstrated that the naval campaign, based upon the balanced fleet, is the true expression of naval power in its most forceful sense.

Fleet marine forces of combined arms are the unique attributes of our naval organization. Consequently, it seems to be more than a matter of coincidence that Congress should choose the section of the Security Act pertaining to the Marine Corps in which to give statutory recognition to the naval campaign.

The third sentence of the section states that: "It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by the landing forces." This has the effect of Congressional mandate that the Marine Corps shall have a major role in all

stations, and bases. This is a reaffirmation of such functions originally assigned the Corps by law in 1798.

In addition to these specific functions, the Corps may be assigned such additional functions as the President may direct. Accordingly, Marines may still, as provided by previous law, be assigned for duty with the Army, or such other functions as are not specifically prescribed by law. There is but one restriction placed on Presidential assignment of additional duties. The law states "That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized." Thus, Congress pointedly insists that, regardless of what additional duties are assigned, such additional duties shall not endanger the fundamentally amphibious character of the Marine Corps.

Under the new law, the Marine Corps Reserve will continue to be a major factor in the expansion of the Corps in event of a war. Such statutory recognition of the Marine Corps Reserve, as well as a guarantee of its continued existence,

". . . The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide Fleet Marine Forces for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations necessary for a naval campaign . . ."

future amphibious development. Most certainly, the Corps is not to be the only agency within the the armed forces responsible for the development of amphibious tactics, technique, and equipment, but at the same time the Corps is designated, by statute, as a developing agency, thus assuring the Corps that it will be able to continue its progress in the field of amphibious operations. Since amphibious operations may involve the employment of airborne units, the amphibious development activities of the Corps will permit continued progress in the utilization of aircraft as a means of transporting landing force units.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that the only instance in which the National Security Act of 1947 makes reference to amphibious operations, with respect to either operating forces or development activities, is the section of the law pertaining to the Marine Corps. In this respect the law continues the precedent by which the Marine Corps has been the focal influence in the evolution of modern amphibious doctrine.

Also, the new law assigns the Marine Corps the traditional functions of providing detachments and organizations for armed ships, naval

is contained in the portion of the law stating that: "the Marine Corps shall be responsible . . . for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war."

In way of summation it can be seen that under the National Security Act of 1947 the Marine Corps is now by law assigned a major status within the armed forces of the nation. The traditional detachment and garrison duties are reaffirmed. Of transcendent importance is the fact that the amphibious character of the Corps is legally recognized. The concept of naval campaign, in which the fleet marine forces find their logical justification, is recognized as a fundamental feature of our nation's sea power. Specifically, fleet marine forces of combined arms are accorded statutory status, and the Corps is assured a prominent role in future amphibious development.

The National Security Act of 1947 has been authoritatively described the most important legislation of its kind in the nation's history. The accuracy of this description can not be questioned from the standpoint of the Marine Corps.

US MC

TO THE EDITOR

Message Center

Discipline vs Discrimination . . .

DEAR SIR:

The recent attack by a columnist of the Scripps-Howard papers on the command of Gen "Court-house" Lee in Italy touched off the question of the caste system in the Armed Forces once again and indicated that the time has come to educate the general public about the true facts of military life.

To safeguard against further flagrant attacks as the recent one, the public must be made to see the definite line of distinction which separates military discipline and discrimination. The importance of discipline, in all degrees, as an integral part of military training and military life, must also be made crystal clear.

In the latest case brought before the public eye the majority of the criticism heaped on the Army Command was concerned with discipline. The question of strict military rigidity had no place in the over-all question at hand and should not have been incorporated as a homogeneous part. Either because the newspaper people could not see the distinction themselves or because they were aware that the deletion of this aspect of their articles would detract immeasurably from the impact desired, they treated all the facts as testimony of an overbearing officer clique.

It is not at all unlikely that this latest case will be used as a wedge for taking other Commands to task, with flimsy hearsay evidence given by disgruntled persons to their civilian "benefactors" as the basis of the attacks. The time is ripe now to counterattack and discredit the charges as heinous distortions of the truth.

The best course is one which will give the general

Each month the GAZETTE will pay five dollars for each letter printed. These pages are intended for comments and corrections on past articles and as a discussion center for pet theories, battle lessons, training expedients, and what have you. Signatures will be withheld if requested.

public a clear cut definition of military discipline, and secondly, a clear cut explanation as to why it is necessary in the military life. It is a herculean job. But one which can, and must, be done if the Armed Forces are going to protect themselves from further unwarranted attacks by persons with pure sensationalism as their ultimate goal.

First and foremost the present systems of encouraging enlistments which emphasize that "things aren't the way they used to be" should be discontinued. Instead of this namby-pambying of recruits, the form of recruiting which plays up the fact that things won't be all honey and roses should be more widespread. This latter appeal is made to the inherent feelings of pride, desires for self-accomplishment and ability to overcome obstacles, which are imbedded in the type of men desired to make up the peace-time military forces in this country.

Military discipline, it should be emphasized, is not a hardship nor does it denote discrimination. A man stands at attention when talking to a superior or pays him other military honors not just to satisfy the vanity of the superior but because it has been proved to be the tried and true military relationship.

The many little things which go to make up military discipline should be explained as not being petty but in reality a well integrated system with one end in mind—a closely knit, well organized, efficient command. It should be further shown that the more rigidly military discipline is carried out, usually the better trained and more potent unit will result.

A comparison of two imaginary commands helps to illustrate the value of discipline.

Example A: The customs and courtesies of the service are moldy from disuse. The troops are pampered and to the untrained eye all seems serene.

Example B: The antithesis of the first example is shown here. Strict military discipline is practiced. The salute is the greeting between all ranks and between officer and enlisted man.

Which command would you rather serve in? I think that there are very few who would not say, "The latter." For here there will be a pride and satisfaction not found in the lax command. Initiative is enhanced when advancement is given rewards in other things than just a pay boost.

So it is in the whole military organization. Initia-

tive is fostered and abetted when rewards of the goal sought after are clear cut. Military discipline, in effect, is one of the basics upon which our peace-time military forces must be built. It has been proven in the past to be the most effective military procedure. It is actually the most democratic, also. For a man can advance according to his own dictates and abilities, attaining an improved standard in return for his efforts.

The sooner the necessity of discipline is explained and the misconceptions of discrimination shown, the sooner will the separate commands within the Armed Forces be buttressed against such unprovoked attacks as we recently witnessed.

HENRY J. BLOSSY,
Captain, USMCR

Public Information . . .

DEAR SIR:

The subject of public information is not a routine one in the curriculum of the average marine. Unless he is assigned duty in the Public Information section or in the recruiting service, a marine is very seldom aware of the importance of the representation of the Corps to the general public.

Public information is a broad field. Too often, even personnel on such duty mistake mere publicity as the entire substance of public information. Publicity is actually just one tactical phase of the strategy of public information policy.

The aim of public information is to give the citizens of this nation an accurate and timely picture of the activities and purposes of their Marine Corps. Publicity is the tool of this aim. At all times the result of publicity should be a favorable impression. Spectacular stunts will get newspaper space sometimes, but to be of any great value, the stunt should be a lead to a more serious approach of real recognition of the worth of the Marine Corps.

It is easily understood that it requires trained personnel to adequately and efficiently perform such a service. The procurement, training, and functioning of this branch of the Corps is often overlooked by marines engaged in other duties. Ironically, the greatest task frequently encountered by public information personnel is to "sell" other marines on the benefits of good publicity.

The attitude met is that public information duty is something superfluous and just another nuisance tacked on by higher authority. The average officer and man regards it as not relating to him or his work and consequently has little interest or sympathy for the personnel performing such duties. Too often the

publicity sergeant is viewed as an "eager beaver" with a soft billet.

To clarify this misunderstanding, it would be a valuable plan to include in the training of all officers and men a brief course in the role of the Marine Corps Public Information Division and integrated importance to the mission of the Corps.

It is not suggested that the proposal in any way attempt to make every marine a trained publicity man, but at least it would provide all personnel with an appreciation of the problem and also make them conscious of the fact that every marine has a collateral duty as a recruiter and an obligation to make sure that the Marine Corps is always represented accurately and favorably in prestige and integrity.

R. N. BARRETT, JR.
Major, USMC

That Khaki Jacket . . .

DEAR SIR:

Being only a lowly peon with but 18 months' service in the Corps, I may not have the right to express my opinion (at least that's how some sergeants feel), but nevertheless, I am going to do so.

I have (before and after entering the Marine Corps) always been proud of the neat, military appearance that personnel in the Corps have shown. Now I can't go on liberty without at least once hearing someone mention how the Marine Corps has slumped in its dress appearance.

Do you know what has caused this? These new khaki battle jackets. You just can't get these new jackets to look halfway presentable. If you send them to the laundry to be washed and starched, all the buttons break. If you send them to the cleaners for a dry cleaning and a press job they come back with only the sleeves pressed. It is neither the laundry's nor the cleaner's fault. They can't do a thing about it. I, myself, have sweated over this jacket for an hour or more only to go on liberty and have it fouled up within 15 minutes. After this 15 minutes was up you couldn't tell if I was wearing a seabag or what have you.

May I ask, just why were these jackets made? They only make it hotter for us during the summer. Civilians and other different branches of service have commented on them and it wasn't complimentary.

Come now, won't they (whoever "they" might be) own up to it and admit their mistake?

Let's get rid of this menace to the Marine Corps "spit and polish" reputation.

ROBERT F. DALZELL
Private, USMC.

✓ Check List

About Marines

AL SCHMID, MARINE	Roger Butterfield	\$2.50
A RIBBON AND A STAR	Monks & Falter	2.75
BOOT	Cpl Gilbert Bailey	2.50
CORAL COMES HIGH	Capt George P. Hunt	2.00
GUIDEBOOK FOR MARINES		1.00
I'VE GOT MINE	Capt Richard G. Hubler	2.50
IWO JIMA	Capt Raymond Henri	.75
ON TO WESTWARD	Robert Sherrod	3.00
PELELIU LANDING	Tom Lea	2.75
SEMPER FIDELIS, an anthology,	Marine Combat Correspondents	3.50
TARAWA	Robert Sherrod	2.00
TARAWA (pictorial)	Sgt Dick Hannah	.75
THE FOURTH MARINE DIVISION	Unit History	5.00
THE ISLAND (Guadalcanal)	Capt Herbert Merillat	3.00
THE ISLAND WAR	Maj Frank O. Hough	5.00
THE LONG, THE SHORT, AND THE TALL	Sgt Alvin M. Josephy	3.00
THE MARINE CORPS READER	Col Clyde H. Metcalfe	3.00
THE NINTH MARINES	Unit History	5.00
THE STORY OF WAKE ISLAND	Col James P. S. Devereux	2.75
UNCOMMON VALOR	Six Combat Correspondents	3.00
U. S. MARINES ON IWO JIMA		3.50
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE MARINES	Capt John Craige	2.50
YOUR MARINE CORPS IN WORLD WAR II	Capt Andrew R. Bergstrom	
	Capt Earl J. Wilson	
	Sgt Frank A. Sick	4.00

World War II

ALL BUT ME AND THEE	BrigGen Elliot D. Cooke	2.75
AMERICA AND TOTAL WAR	Fletcher Pratt	3.00
BATTLE REPORT Vol I (Pearl Harbor to Coral Sea)	Karig and Kelly	3.50
BATTLE REPORT Vol II (Atlantic War)	Capt John Craige	3.50
BATTLE REPORT Vol III (Pacific War—Middle Phase)	Wainwright and Considine	5.00
RATTLE STATIONS	Navy Leaders	3.95
BRAVE MEN	Ernie Pyle	1.39
BURMA SURGEON	Seagrave	3.00
CAMPAIGNS OF THE PACIFIC	G. P. O.	2.25
FLEET AGAINST JAPAN	Fletcher Pratt	3.00
GENERAL WAINWRIGHT'S STORY		
GERMAN RESEARCH IN WORLD WAR II	Col Leslie E. Simon	4.00
HISTORY OF THE MODERN AMERICAN NAVY	Donald W. Mitchell	4.50
HISTORY OF WORLD WAR II	Francis T. Miller	5.00
INTERROGATIONS OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS Vol I	G. P. O.	1.50
INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE OFFICIALS Vol II	G. P. O.	1.50
IT IS DARK UNDERGROUND	Loo Pin Fei	2.75
MONTGOMERY, A Biography	Alan Moorhead	4.00
NIGHT WORK	Fletcher Pratt	3.00
OUR SHARE OF NIGHT	Drew Middleton	3.75

All of these books are readily available through the Gazette Bookshop. Remember, there is a ten per cent discount for all Marine Corps Association members . . .

OUT OF UNIFORM	Benjamin Bowker	2.75
PATTON AND HIS THIRD ARMY	Col Brenton G. Wallace	3.00
PEARL HARBOR: STORY OF THE SECRET WAR	George Morgenstern	3.00
RETREAT WITH STILWELL	Belden	3.00
SECRET MISSIONS	Capt Ellis M. Zacharias	3.75
SILENT IS THE VISTULA	Irene Orska	3.00
STORIES OF CHINA AT WAR	Chi-Chen Wang	2.50
STRANGE ALLIANCE	MajGen John R. Deane	3.75
THE ARMED FORCES AS A CAREER	North Callahan	3.00
THE BATTLE FOR LEYTE GULF	C. Van Woodward	4.00
THE BRERETON DIARIES	LtGen Lewis H. Brereton	4.00
THE LOST WAR	Matsuo Kato	2.75
THE NAVY'S AIR WAR	Lt A. R. Buchanan, USNR	3.50
THE NAVY HAS WINGS	Fletcher Pratt	2.75
THE UNITED STATES AT WAR		
THUNDER OUT OF CHINA	Bureau of the Budget	1.00
TOP SECRET	White & Jacoby	3.50
THE WAR REPORTS	Ralph Ingersoll	3.00
	Gen George C. Marshall	
	Gen H. H. Arnold	
	Adm Ernest J. King	7.00
	John Schwarwaldner	3.00
WE CAUGHT SPIES	Fletcher Pratt	2.50
WHAT THE CITIZEN SHOULD KNOW ABOUT MODERN WAR	Roger W. Shugg & Maj H. A. DeWeerd	3.00
WORLD WAR II	Fred Eldridge	3.00
WRATH IN BURMA	Yank Staff	5.00
YANK—THE GI STORY OF WAR		

Service Humor

MALE CALL	Milton Caniff	\$1.00
MOM, I'M HOME	Sid Hoff	1.00
SAD SACK	George Baker	2.00
SO THIS IS PEACE	Bob Hope	2.50
THE WOLF	Leonard Sansone	1.00
UP FRONT	Bill Mauldin	3.00

Humor

PLAYBOY'S HANDBOOK	William A. Brooks	\$1.98
THORNE SMITH 3 DECKER	Thorne Smith	1.49
TO HELL WITH HUNTING	Ed Zern	2.00

Texts and References

A BASIC MANUAL OF MILITARY SMALL ARMS		\$5.00
AMERICAN SEAPOWER SINCE 1775	Allan Wescott	5.00
ELEMENTS OF AMMUNITION	Maj Theodore C. Ohart	6.00
FRONT-LINE INTELLIGENCE	LtCol Stedman Chandler & Col Robert W. Robb	2.50
GAS TURBINE AND JET PROPULSION FOR AIRCRAFT	G. Geoffrey Smith	5.00
GUN CARE & REPAIR	Charles E. Chapel	3.75
GUN DIGEST		1.25
HUNTING BIG GAME, two volumes	Col Townsend Whelen	8.00

JOMINI'S ART OF WAR	LtCol J. D. Hittle	2.50	MRS. MIKE	Freedman & Freeman	3.00
MANNLICHER RIFLES AND PISTOLS	Walter H. B. Smith	5.00	NAVY WIFE	Anne Pye and Nancy Shea	2.50
MAUSER RIFLES AND PISTOLS	Walter H. B. Smith	5.00	NIGHT AND THE CITY	Gerald Kersh	2.75
MODERN JUDO, 2 Volumes	Charles Yerkow	5.00	NOT SO WILD A DREAM	Eric Sevareid	3.50
OFFICER'S MANUAL	James Moss	2.50	ON POKER	Oswald Jacoby	1.50
ORDNANCE FIELD GUIDE		2.50	OUR OWN KIND	Edward McCorley	2.50
REMINGTON HANDGUNS		5.00	OUR SHARE OF NIGHT	Drew Middleton	3.75
RIFLES AND MACHINE GUNS		2.50	PAST ALL DISHONOR	James M. Cain	2.00
RIOT CONTROL	Capt Melvin M. Johnson	7.50	PEACE OF MIND	Joshua L. Liebman	2.50
ROGET'S THESAURUS	Sterling Wood	2.00	PRESIDENTIAL MISSION	Upton Sinclair	3.50
THE ARMY WRITER	C. D. Sylvester Mason	1.98	RECONQUEST	Hallett Abend	2.75
THE MILITARY STAFF	David Klein	2.50	RETURN TO NIGHT	Mary Renault	3.00
THE STRENGTH WE NEED	LtCol J. D. Hittle	2.50	RHUBARB	H. Allen Smith	2.00
WALTHER PISTOLS	Maj George Fielding Eliot	3.00	SECRET THE SONG	Elizabeth Kjellberg	2.75
WEAPONS AND TACTICS	W. H. B. Smith	2.00	SHORE DIMLY SEEN	Ellis Arnall	3.00
	Tom Wintringham	2.25	SHOWDOWN	Errol Flynn	2.50
			STRANGER IN TOWN	Howard Hunt	2.50
			STRIKEOUT STORY	Bob Feller	2.75
			TALES OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC		

Historical

A STUDY IN HISTORY	Arnold J. Toynbee	\$5.00	THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT	James A. Michener	3.00
CAESAR'S GALlic CAMPAIGNE			THE AMERICAN	Merriam Smith	2.50
DuPICQ'S BATTLE STUDIES	LtCol S. G. Brady	2.50	THE BIG SKY	Howard Fast	3.00
FIFTEEN DECISIVE BATTLES	Col Ardent DuPicq	2.00	THE BLACK ROSE	A. B. Guthrie	3.50
LEE'S LIEUTENANTS, three volumes	Creasey & Murray	4.00	THE CHEQUER BOARD	Thomas Costain	1.50
	Douglas S. Freeman		THE COAT I WORE	Nevil Shute	2.75
LETTERS FROM LEE'S ARMY	Susan L. Blackford	3.50	THE DEVIL IS A LONELY MAN	Lucile Finlay	3.00
MASTERS OF MOBILE WARFARE	Eldridge Colby	2.00	THE EGG AND I	Wood	3.00
R. E. LEE, four volumes	Douglas S. Freeman	20.00	THE FALL OF VALOR	Betty MacDonald	2.75
STONEWALL JACKSON	Henderson	5.00	THE FOUNTAINHEAD	Charles Jackson	2.75
WAR YEARS WITH JEB STUART	LtCol W. W. Blackford	3.00	THE GREAT SNOW	Ayn Rand	3.00

Best Sellers

ALL THY CONQUESTS	Alfred Hayes	2.75	THE LIGHT HEART	Elswyth Thane	2.75
ANIMAL FARM	George Orwell	1.75	THE MAGNIFICENT BARB	Dana Faralla	2.50
ARCH OF TRIUMPH	Erich Maria Remarque	3.00	THE MIRACLE OF THE BELLS	Russell Janney	3.00
ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY	Donald M. Nelson	4.00	THEN AND NOW	W. Somerset Maugham	2.50
AS HE SAW IT	Elliott Roosevelt	3.00	THE QUARRY	Mildred Walker	3.00
AURORA DAWN	Herman Wouk	2.75	THE RAZOR'S EDGE	W. Somerset Maugham	1.00
B. F.'S DAUGHTER	John P. Marquand	2.75	THERE WAS A TIME	Taylor Caldwell	3.00
BREAD AND RICE	Doris Rubens	3.00	THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW	Frances Perkins	3.75
BRITANNIA MEWS	Margery Sharp	2.75	THE SALEM FRIGATE	John Jennings	3.00
CIDER FROM EDEN	Nancy Bruff	2.75	THE SCARLET PATCH	Bruce Lancaster	3.00
COMMAND DECISION	Wilbam Wister Haines	2.50	THE SLING AND THE ARROW	Stuart Engstrand	3.00
DULCIMER STREET	Norman Collins	3.00	THE SNAKE PIT	Mary Jane Ward	2.50
EAST RIVER	Sholem Asch	3.00	THE STRANGE ALLIANCE		
END AS A MAN	Calder Willingharn	2.75	THE TIN FLUTE	MajGen John R. Deane	3.75
FORESTAE OF GLORY	Jesse Stuart	2.50	THE VIXENS	Gabrielle Roy	3.00
FOREVER AMBER	Kathleen Winsor	3.00	THE WALLS OF JERICHO	Frank Yerby	2.75
FORTUNE GIFT	Susan Kerby	2.75	THE WAYWARD BUS	Paul I. Wellman	3.00
GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT	Laura Z. Hobson	2.75	THE WEB OF DAYS	John Steinbeck	2.75
GOLDEN EGG	Pollak	3.00	THIS IS MY STORY	Edna Lee	2.75
GRAND CENTRAL	David Marshall	3.50	THIS IS THE YEAR	Louis F. Budenz	3.00
HOME COUNTY	Ernie Pyle	4.00	THREE CAME HOME	Feike Feikima	3.00
HOUSE OF MIST	Marie Luisa Bomhal	2.75	THREE DAYS	Agnes Newton Keith	3.00
I CHOSE FREEDOM	Victor Kravchenko	3.50	TOGETHER	Stephen Longstreet	2.75
IDOLS OF THE CAVE	Prokosch	2.75	TOO EARLY TO TELL	Katherine I. Marshall	3.50
INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC	John Kieran	2.00	TOUCHSTONE	Jerome Weidman	3.00
JOURNEY TO THE END OF AN ERA	Melvin Hall	3.75	VERMILION	Lillian Janet	3.00
KINGSBLOOD ROYAL	Sinclair Lewis	3.00	WEAK AND THE STRONG	Iwal Jones	3.00
KNOCK ON MY DOOR	Willard Motley	3.00	WEB OF LUCIFER	Gerald Kersh	2.50
LAST CHAPTER	Ernie Pyle	2.50	WRITE SORROW ON THE EARTH	Maurice Samuel	3.00
LINCOLN READER	Paul M. Angle	3.75		Charles Wertenbaker	2.75
LORD HORNBLOWER	C. S. Forester	2.50	22 CELLS IN NUERMBERG	Douglas M. Kelley	3.00
LYDIA BAILEY	Kenneth Roberts	3.00			
MR. ADAMS	Pat Frank	2.50			
MR. ROBERTS	Thomas Heggen	2.50			

Remember that the Gazette Bookshop sells not only the books listed above but will attempt to find for its patrons any book still in print. An order form is on the following page.

Remember Those 1945 *Gazette* Covers?

The Capture of the Reindeer . . . The Florida War . . . Suppressing African Slave Trade . . . Apprehending Seal Poachers . . . The Boxer Rebellion . . . The Flag Goes Up on Mt Suribachi

Either a new subscription or a renewal entitles you to a set of full color reprints of these important historical paintings by John Clymer and Tom Lovell.

THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

Professional Magazine of the Marine Corps
BOX 106, MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS
QUANTICO, VA.

1047

Dear Sir: Please send me one set of cover reprints. I enclose \$3.00 for which —

- Enter my name for a one year subscription to the GAZETTE.
- As I am qualified for membership, enroll me as a member of the Marine Corps Association.*
- As I am already a GAZETTE subscriber please extend my subscription.

NAME AND RANK _____

ADDRESS _____

Signed _____

*Membership in the *Marine Corps Association* includes a one year subscription to the GAZETTE and a 10 per cent discount on purchases from the GAZETTE Bookshop.

SEND AIR MAIL—

GET QUICKER SERVICE

ORDER FORM Gazette Bookshop

MARINE CORPS SCHOOLS, BOX 106, QUANTICO, VA.

Order by title only, enclosing remittance.

Enclosed is \$ _____ for the following order of books:

No C.O.D.'s

Title	Price
1.	
2.	
3.	
4.	

NAME _____

(Print)

ADDRESS _____

(Print)

Make Checks or Money Orders Payable to Marine Corps Gazette Bookshop.
Members of the Association entitled to 10 Per Cent Discount on Books. G-10-47

The Blue Uniform



U. S. MARINE CORPS.

continued from the back cover

Chevrons had not yet come into use and enlisted rank designation was a confusing matter of brass counterstraps, cuff buttons, yellow worsted lace, and sword sashes. On fatigue clothing, however, the matter was growing simpler; the chevron was evolving and the sergeants wore two diagonal stripes below the elbow and the corporals one.

With the officers, the uniform similarities of 1840 and 1947 are not quite so obvious. For one thing, the coat was double breasted and bore heavy epaulets which gave the basic blue coat an appearance totally different from today's uniform. The cocked hat, complete with plumes, has disappeared as has the sword sash.

Designation of officer ranks was as confusing as the enlisted insignia, being a combination of epaulets, facings, and coat lengths.

Only on the undress uniform was the present system of eagles, leaves (then called "flowers"), and bars ("oblong squares") beginning to be used.

One thing that has remained forever unchanged is the officer's sword. Perpetuating the O'Bannon legend, the orders of 1839 prescribe that the curved blade should have "a mamaluke hilt of white ivory."

The globe and anchor badge had not yet definitely been derived, but it was emerging. The Marine buttons were to be "Gilt, convex, with eagle, anchor and stars, raised border." Officers of the staff, as with aides today, were distinguished by "gold eguilettes, worn on the right shoulder under the epaulette."

The scarlet coats of the Marine Band also had their predecessors in 1840. Regulations provided that musicians should be uniformed the same as other enlisted ranks "except that the color of the coat be red, with white linings, collar and turnbacks."

EHS

The old lithographed prints reproduced here and the uniform regulations quoted above were published in October 1840 in the U. S. Military Magazine, a short-lived forerunner of modern military journalism. The GAZETTE is indebted to the Old Print Shop of New York City and to the Free Library of Philadelphia for assistance in locating this rare magazine.

The Blue Uniform



U.S. MARINE CORPS

TRADITIONALLY, the public knows the Marine blue uniform better than any other Marine symbol. Even a war fought in dungarees has failed to erase the popular image. Perhaps that is why the recruiter's favorite device is still a heroic-sized marine in "dress blues." From the beginning, blue has been a favorite color with the Marines, perhaps because it was the antithesis of the British scarlet. But during the first seventy years of the Marine Corps other colors, principally grays and greens, were also widely used in the then rapidly changing and loosely enforced uniform regulations.

It remained for Archibald Henderson, long-termed Colonel Commandant and solidifier of many a Marine custom, to establish the forebear of the Marine dress blues. Col Henderson proposed his uniform regulations to the Secretary of the Navy on 22 May 1839. They were approved on 29 May and issued as orders to the Marine Corps on 1 July to take effect from and after the 4th of July of the following year. Nearly every feature of the present day blue uniform is to be found in its original form in these uniform regulations of 1839.

They prescribed that the coat should be made of "Navy blue cloth, single breasted." There was a standing collar and the cuff had "three buttons and loops on the slash sleeve." The crossbelts were of white fabric. The collar and cuffs survive today in simpler form. The crossbelts have their counterpart in the white waist belt. Only the skirts of the coat have greatly changed. In 1840 the coat was cut off at the waist in front with tails in the back reaching nearly to the bend of the knee. There were no outside pockets—a tradition that lasted until just last year.

The trousers were "light sky blue cloth from the 15th October to the 30th April, and white linen or cotton" for the summer months. The trouser stripe was dark blue; the famous red stripe not appearing until after the Mexican War.

Happily, for all concerned, the pompon decorated shako has disappeared. However, there was a fatigue cap authorized, "blue cloth with a black patent leather visor." Its descendant, the present day frame cap, is quite similar. *continued on the inside cover*